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STOCK MARKET PRICES AND THE 




The manner in which hostile takeovers have historically been 
executed has just begun to receive serious academic attention. Similar-
ly, while the literature on the accuracy and determinants of share 
prices is voluminous, there has been little systematic historical analy-
sis of when and how modern standards of share price efficiency took 
shape. This Article addresses both subjects in depth to ascertain the 
extent to which developments in the market for corporate control may 
have been associated with, or facilitated by, developments in stock 
market efficiency. We identify potential linkages between hostile con-
trol transactions and stock market pricing and explore these linkages 
empirically with a new hand-collected dataset of control contests oc-
curring between 1900 and 1965. We show that, while the evolution of 
acquiror tactics in control contests was plausibly linked in some cir-
cumstances to changes affecting the manner in which shares were 
priced, other factors have to be taken into account to explain how the 
market for corporate control developed over this period. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Stock market prices should play an important role in the market for 
corporate control. In considering a potential takeover, a would-be ac-
quiror will compare the current stock price, which provides a market 
generated estimate of the firm’s value under its incumbent management 
team, with what could be achieved under new ownership. This estimate is 
particularly important for hostile acquirors, who are unlikely to be given 
access to private information by the target company’s board. Acquirors 
also anticipate that the target’s share price (and their own, if they are 
publically traded companies) will move in a reasonably predictable way 
once news of the prospective bid becomes public, with the market’s as-
sessment of the price offered and the likelihood of success dictating the 
size of the change. 
Such links between share prices and the market for corporate con-
trol presuppose that the stock market is (more or less) ‘‘efficient’’ in at 
least two senses. First, in the sense of being ‘‘informationally efficient,’’ 
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such that share prices promptly impound available information.1 And 
second, in the sense that stock prices are ‘‘fundamentally efficient,’’ 
meaning they reflect accurately what companies are actually worth.2 
Conventional wisdom has it that the market for corporate control in 
U.S. public companies only took its modern form in the 1950s and 1960s, 
though its origins can be traced back decades earlier.3 It also seems likely 
that stock market pricing evolved substantially throughout the course of 
the twentieth century, given regulatory changes, technological advances, 
and growing academic interest in the topic. In this Article, we explore 
whether these timelines are related and consider in particular whether 
there was a move to more ‘‘efficient’’ share prices that affected the way 
takeovers were done. In so doing, we focus specifically on hostile trans-
actions because, as explained, market pricing is particularly important for 
such deals. 
Given the importance of share prices for the market for corporate 
control, one might think that the interrelationship would be well under-
stood. This is not the case, at least from a historical perspective. While 
the literature on the accuracy and determinants of share prices is volu-
minous, there has been relatively little analysis of how and when modern 
standards of stock market efficiency took shape. Similarly, the manner in 
which hostile takeovers have historically been executed has just begun to 
receive serious academic attention.4 In this Article, we offer what is to 
our knowledge the first unified account of the development of these two 
phenomena. We take an empirically-oriented approach to ascertain the 
extent to which developments in stock market efficiency impacted upon 
the market for corporate control. In particular, we derive insights from a 
new hand-collected dataset of control contests in U.S. companies cover-
ing from the beginning of the twentieth century until the mid-1960s,5 by 
which time the market for corporate control had evolved into a form 
readily recognizable to modern readers. 
Our inquiry yields novel insights into both control contests and the 
pricing of shares. With share prices, one might presume that in the ab-
sence of modern information technology, market pricing would have 
been a primitive affair. The scale and depth of information impounded 
into share prices was indeed less substantial than it subsequently became. 
On the other hand, during the opening decades of the twentieth century 
share prices reacted promptly to market news in a way that would be fa-
miliar to modern observers.6 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. Prices can be informationally efficient in a variety of different ways. See infra note 14 and 
accompanying text.  
 2. On differences between informational and fundamental efficiency, see note 18. 
 3. John Armour & Brian Cheffins, The Origins of the Market for Corporate Control, 2014 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1835, 1836--38 [hereinafter Armour & Cheffins, Origins of the Market]. 
 4. A recent article of ours is the first concerted attempt to analyze the functioning of the market 
for corporate control during the opening half of the 20th century. See id. 
 5. This dataset draws on, but significantly expands, data presented in earlier work. See id. (pre-
senting data on US market for corporate control from 1900--1949). 
 6. See infra notes 138, 173--74 and accompanying text. 
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The trends concerning share prices likely had significant implica-
tions for control contests. Our data reveal that the annual number of 
control contests grew between 1900 and the 1960s.7 The fact that mid-
twentieth century bidders could assume share prices were more accurate 
than would have been the case earlier in the century due to impounding 
a wider range of salient information and could also investigate potential 
targets more thoroughly due to more extensive disclosure may well have 
contributed to the growth of the market for corporate control. These 
trends also help to explain a finding of ours that it became more common 
over time for parties lacking a pre-existing connection with targets, such 
as operating in the same industry, to launch takeover bids. 
Our most striking empirical finding concerns a change of takeover 
technique adopted by bidders endeavoring to buy a controlling stake in a 
public company target, and our analysis of share prices helps to explain 
why this occurred. In the opening decades of the twentieth century, a 
raider seeking to obtain control of a target by purchasing a majority of 
the shares would almost always launch what we refer to as an ‘‘open 
market bid’’ (or ‘‘OMB’’),8 which involves an acquiror, acting on its own 
initiative rather than on the invitation of management, seeking to buy 
sufficient shares on the stock market to acquire control.9 After a hiatus in 
attempts by raiders to secure voting control of targets during the 1930s 
and 1940s, we find that cash tender offers became the tactic of choice in 
the 1950s and the 1960s. 
An OMB can be a ruinously expensive way to acquire control be-
cause the target’s share price may rise dramatically as a result of the ac-
quiror’s buying activities. The tender offer is a pragmatic response 
through which the acquiror seeks to cap the price at which the shares will 
be acquired, with the price being fixed for those who tender their 
shares.10 Why then were OMBs used instead of tender offers during the 
opening decades of the twentieth century? Our analysis of the historical 
development of stock market efficiency offers important clues, emphasiz-
ing in particular that, as the twentieth century got under way, an OMB 
was less likely to drive up share prices of targets dramatically, as com-
pared with later decades.11 Part of the reason was likely that bidders had 
scope, unavailable today, to rely on market manipulation techniques to 
disguise the buying that was occurring. It also is likely that even savvy in-
vestors struggled to deduce from share price fluctuations that an OMB 
                                                                                                                                         
 7. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 8. We initially deployed this term in John H. Armour & Brian R. Cheffins, Origins of ‘‘Offen-
sive’’ Shareholder Activism in the United States, in ORIGINS OF SHAREHOLDER ADVOCACY 253, 270 
(Jonathan G.S. Koppell ed., 2011) [hereinafter Armour & Cheffins, Origins of ‘‘Offensive’’ Sharehold-
er Activism]. 
 9. Such a bid could be accompanied by off-market purchases from significant shareholders. If, 
however, a party obtains majority control by purchasing shares off-market from a tight coalition of 
investors we assume this is a friendly takeover rather than an OMB. See infra notes 50--51 and accom-
panying text.  
 10. A bidder who relies on a tender offer can, however, subsequently raise the tender offer price.  
 11. See infra Part V.F. 
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was underway, in large part because companies at the beginning of the 
twentieth century were disclosing much less financial information than 
their counterparts later in the century.12 
The rest of the Article is structured as follows. Parts II and III set 
the scene. Part II focuses on the manner in which shares are priced, ex-
plaining in so doing the various ways in which share prices can be 
thought of as ‘‘efficient.’’ Part III describes the range of different tech-
niques a would-be bidder might deploy in order to gain control of a tar-
get company against the wishes of its management and identifies the 
conditions under which each would be most attractive to the insurgent. 
In Part IV we present our hand-collected dataset of control con-
tests, which encompasses OMBs, contested tender offers (both cash and 
share-for-share exchange offers) and proxy contests where board control 
was at stake. After providing a concise summary of key time trends the 
data reveals, we offer a series of conjectures on the extent to which share 
price trends might explain our findings. Part V describes how the pricing 
of shares developed from 1900 through to the 1960s in the United States 
and spells out the implications for contested control transactions, based 
on the analysis in Parts II to IV have provided. Part VI concludes, em-
phasizing in so doing that while share prices do not explain all facets of 
the market for corporate control, changes to the pricing of shares do ac-
count at least partly for certain key developments with takeovers, as the 
market for corporate control began taking on the form familiar to most 
readers. 
II. SHARE PRICES AND EFFICIENCY-----A PRÉCIS 
Before considering our empirical evidence concerning the operation 
of market for corporate control between 1900 and 1965 and embarking 
on our historical analysis of share prices, it is necessary to put matters in-
to context. In Part III, we will do this by providing a succinct overview of 
takeover techniques we consider throughout the remainder of the Arti-
cle. At this point, we explain the nature of share prices, and most particu-
larly their ‘‘efficiency.’’ We focus on ‘‘efficiency’’ because we rely on this 
term extensively as we explore the interaction between share prices and 
takeovers. We also seek to clarify its meaning because the ways in which 
it is used can be confusing. 
Discussions concerning share prices and efficiency typically center 
on the efficient capital markets hypothesis, or ‘‘ECMH.’’13 The ECMH 
focuses on ‘‘informational efficiency,’’ which is assessed by how quickly 
                                                                                                                                         
 12. See infra Part V.B.  
 13. The literature on the ECMH is voluminous. Oft-cited treatments of the ECMH include Eu-
gene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) 
[hereinafter Fama, A Review]; Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991). 
See also BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 137--41, 157--63, 182--84 (11th 
ed. 2015). The account provided here is drawn largely from BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: 
THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 55--58 (1997).  
CHEFFINS-ARMOUR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2016 11:13 AM 
766 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2016 
and how fully share prices adjust to reflect the revelation of new infor-
mation relevant to the pricing of these securities. There are three ver-
sions of the hypothesis: the ‘‘weak’’ form, the ‘‘semi-strong’’ form, and 
the ‘‘strong’’ form.14 
A stock market is informationally efficient in the ‘‘weak’’ sense if 
current share prices fully reflect all information contained in past share 
prices. Under such circumstances, the future movement of share prices 
will constitute a ‘‘random walk’’ unrelated to past trends, and the study of 
prior price fluctuations will be fruitless as an investment strategy. A mar-
ket is efficient in the ‘‘semi-strong’’ sense if current prices reflect all rele-
vant information that is publicly available. The difference between this 
and the weak form of informational efficiency turns on the fact that a 
wider range of relevant information-----all of that which is publicly availa-
ble rather than merely past trading trends-----is assumed to be incorpo-
rated in stock prices. Finally, the ‘‘strong’’ form of the ECMH is satisfied 
if share prices fully reflect all knowable information, including that which 
is not publicly available. The difference between strong and semi-strong 
form informational efficiency consequently relates to the extent to which 
non-public information is impounded in stock prices. 
It is important to bear in mind that merely because a stock market is 
informationally efficient in any one of the three senses just summarized 
does not necessarily mean that share prices are ‘‘correct’’ or ‘‘accurate’’ in 
the sense that they are perfect, or even highly reliable, indicators of fu-
ture net cash flows and hence the underlying value of shares.15 When a 
corporation’s share price approaches this standard, the share price will 
correspond closely to the intrinsic value of the shares.16 A 1938 study of 
the impact of speculation on stock prices noted that ‘‘[i]n an ideal 
world . . . from a security investor’s point of view, the future would be an 
open book.’’17 This has never been the case, meaning that, with share 
prices depending on expectations about future performance, even the 
best informed investors can only estimate the ‘‘true’’ or ‘‘fundamental’’ 
value of a company’s shares (the present value of future returns share-
holders will receive).18 Consequently, stock prices that are ‘‘information-
ally’’ efficient need not be ‘‘fundamentally’’ efficient, in the sense that a 
                                                                                                                                         
 14. JAMES H. LORIE & MARY T. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 
71 (1973). 
 15. MERRITT B. FOX, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC ECONOMY: 
THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 57--59 (1987); Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corpora-
tions Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945, 968--75 (1991). Economist James Tobin has been credit-
ed with identifying initially the distinction between informational and fundamental efficiency. See 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Ef-
ficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546, 563 (1994) (citing James Tobin, On the 
Efficiency of the Financial System, LLOYDS BANK REV., July 1984, at 2). 
 16. Cunningham, supra note 15, at 564. 
 17. JAMES ALEXANDER ROSS, JR., SPECULATION, STOCK PRICES & INDUSTRIAL FLUCTUATIONS 
69 (1938). 
 18. Cunningham, supra note 15, at 563; Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and 
Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 345 (2003). 
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company’s share price reflects with substantial accuracy the actual value 
of that company. 
While informational efficiency cannot necessarily be equated with 
fundamental efficiency, if stock prices do reflect all available infor-
mation, then a corporation’s share price will plausibly be the best availa-
ble estimate of the value of the business as it is being run. This is because 
the price at which shares trade will be largely dictated by the actions of 
numerous unbiased individuals who have strong financial incentives to 
evaluate anticipated corporate performance as best they can.19 The extent 
to which informational efficiency and share price ‘‘accuracy’’ can be 
equated in practice will depend on two factors: the nature and extent of 
the information available and the means by which investors gain access 
to this information. 
The significance of the nature and the extent of the information 
available can be illustrated by considering the semi-strong form of the 
ECMH. Semi-strong form informational efficiency (or lack thereof) is 
measured by how quickly and thoroughly fresh public information is in-
corporated into share prices. This is conceptually distinct from the 
amount and quality of information that is made public. Consider a situa-
tion where only scant information is publicly available concerning a par-
ticular company’s shares. So long as the share price impounds that public 
information quickly, the share price will be efficient in the semi-strong 
sense.20 
While the nature and extent of information available concerning 
shares need not affect the informational efficiency of share prices in the 
semi-strong form, the situation likely is different with fundamental effi-
ciency. If firm-specific information ‘‘in the market’’ is scant, then even if 
this information is correct and has been impounded rapidly and fully in 
share prices, a firm’s share price likely will be at best a crude indicator of 
the firm’s true value. On the other hand, if share prices incorporate a 
substantial range of financially salient information, it will be much more 
likely that those prices accurately reflect the prospects of the corpora-
tions in question.21 
Although, the nature and extent of the information that is publicly 
available will likely affect the accuracy of stock prices but can vary with-
                                                                                                                                         
 19. CHEFFINS, supra note 13, at 57.  
 20. It is also entirely possible that share prices will be informationally efficient in the weak sense 
without offering reliable guidance on the underlying value of companies. Share prices can be said to 
engage in a ‘‘random walk’’ if they are ‘‘unbiased’’, meaning that on average they do not diverge from 
the actual value of shares either upwards or downwards. This test can be satisfied regardless of the 
amount of information available concerning companies. See Fox et al., supra note 18, at 335; Merritt B. 
Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 115--16 
(1999). 
 21. Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor 
Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1359, 1369--70 (1999); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Infor-
mation Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747, 759 (1985) (‘‘As 
more investment information becomes widely accessible, the marketplace will become even more effi-
cient and the opportunity to identify undervalued securities . . . will diminish.’’).  
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out compromising the possibility of informational efficiency,22 the man-
ner in which information is impounded in share prices can influence 
both.23 Given that shares should be valued by reference to future ex-
pected cash flows,24 the release of new information about a firm’s pro-
spects can cause investors to reassess their expectations and update their 
valuations. The promptness with which this occurs, and the extent to 
which the new information influences share price movements, can affect 
the extent to which those prices are efficient in both the informational 
and fundamental sense. 
The extent to which new and relevant information influences share 
prices varies because investors do not all buy or sell promptly on the ba-
sis of fresh information that is theoretically available. Tracking down and 
analyzing such information can be inconvenient and time-consuming. 
Correspondingly, there are many ‘‘uninformed’’ investors who make de-
cisions about whether to buy, sell, or merely continue to hold shares in 
companies without reference to relevant information that has recently 
become publicly available. Some investors of this type are ‘‘liquidity’’ or 
‘‘time function’’ traders who buy or sell because of personal financial cir-
cumstances (e.g. selling shares to carry out major expenditures or to pay 
taxes) or are looking to rebalance the risk profile of their investment 
portfolio.25 Others, commonly referred to as ‘‘noise’’ traders, erroneously 
believe they have insights or a trading strategy that will deliver superior 
risk-adjusted returns and correspondingly may fail to take into account 
properly truly salient disclosures a corporation makes.26 
On the opposite end of the spectrum from ‘‘uninformed’’ investors 
are ‘‘informed’’ investors. There will, for instance, be investors who are 
‘‘insiders,’’ these being individuals who have access to price-sensitive con-
fidential information due to their proximity to a particular firm and have 
the knowledge and ability to evaluate this information when deciding 
whether to buy or sell shares.27 There will also be informed investors who 
                                                                                                                                         
 22. The proposition advanced here is irrelevant to strong form efficiency because share prices 
meet this standard when all information, public or private, is impounded in the price.  
 23. This discussion draws on JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 
108--12 (2016). 
 24. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 25. On the term ‘‘liquidity’’ trader, see, e.g., Bruno Biais & Pierre Hillion, Insider and Liquidity 
Trading in Stock and Options Markets, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 743, 744 (1994); Thomas E. Copeland & Dan 
Galai, Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread, 38 J. FIN. 1457, 1458 (1983); Zohar Goshen & Gide-
on Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 724 (2006); Avner 
Kalay & Avi Wohl, Detecting Liquidity Traders, 44 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 29, 29--30 (2009) (‘‘While 
there is no generally accepted definition for ‘liquidity traders,’ in many cases this term refers to inves-
tors that trade for reasons other than private information.’’). On the term ‘‘time-function’’ trader, see 
Lloyd R. Cohen, Why Tender Offers? The Efficient Market Hypothesis, the Supply of Stock, and Sig-
naling, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 127 (1990). 
 26. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency 
Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 724 (2003) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraak-
man, Mechanisms Twenty Years Later]; Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25, at 724--25; Andrei 
Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 20 
(1990).  
 27. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25, at 722.  
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engage in ‘‘professionally informed’’ trading. These investors, who have 
carefully honed evaluative skills and will include market professionals 
such as portfolio managers, brokers, and securities analysts, closely track 
data relevant to the future prospects of firms and buy or sell shares ac-
cordingly, or at least make recommendations to that effect.28 The infor-
mation these professionally informed investors analyze will usually be in 
the public domain, though there may be circumstances where they will 
get access to relevant information that is not widely available. The bal-
ance will be dictated to a substantial degree by the amount of infor-
mation a company has divulged to the market, either voluntarily or by 
virtue of legislation compelling disclosure. 
Falling between these ‘‘uninformed’’ traders and ‘‘informed’’ traders 
are investors who, when deciding whether to buy or sell shares, treat 
general market trends or patterns of trading of particular companies as 
crucial. Such investors, who could be otherwise informed or uninformed, 
might engage in ‘‘price decoding,’’ which involves interpreting data on 
price and trading volume concerning shares of a particular corporation to 
deduce relevant private information possessed by informed investors 
trading the shares of that corporation.29 A related possibility is share 
trading based on technical analysis, which involves forecasting the direc-
tion of prices through the study of past market data, often distilled in the 
form of charts. Those engaging in technical analysis typically believe that 
careful scrutiny of what investors have been doing will reveal what ‘‘the 
crowd’’ is likely to do in the future.30 If share prices accord with any form 
of the ECMH, this style of trading will, by definition, fail to succeed in 
delivering superior risk-adjusted investor returns because share prices 
reflect all past trading behavior.31 
The balance between ‘‘uninformed,’’ ‘‘informed,’’ and ‘‘price decod-
ing’’ investors will likely influence the efficiency of share prices, both in 
the informational and fundamental sense.32 The interactions may be quite 
subtle. Assume informed investors dominate share trading. This might be 
expected to improve the speed with which markets adjust to fresh news, 
meaning salient information is impounded promptly. Both informational 
and fundamental efficiency should correspondingly be fostered.33 Con-
versely, if uninformed investors dominate, this will likely slow the pro-
                                                                                                                                         
 28. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. 
REV 549, 571 (1984) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms]. Goshen and Parchomovsky refer 
to these as ‘‘information traders.’’ See supra note 25, at 723.  
 29. Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms, supra note 28, at 575. 
 30. MALKIEL, supra note 13, at 109--10.  
 31. Id. at 132 (quoting a financial economist to the effect that if the weak form of the ECMH is 
valid, ‘‘Technical analysis is akin to astrology and every bit as scientific.’’).  
 32. Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms, supra note 28, at 570 (‘‘The rapidity of such price adjust-
ments depends on the volume of informed trading.’’). 
 33. This is true only up to a point. If the market contains no uninformed investors at all, it will be 
difficult for informed investors to earn superior risk-adjusted returns based on their efforts, meaning 
there will be little incentive to engage in information discovery and analysis. See Sanford J. Grossman 
& Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 
393, 404 (1980). 
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cesses by which relevant new information changes share prices and may 
compromise the accuracy of share prices as a barometer of the intrinsic 
worth of companies. In particular, if uninformed traders have correlated 
reasons for trading, such as a shared erroneous bias in their evaluation of 
stocks, then their trades may drive market prices some distance away 
from what the fundamentals would otherwise dictate. 
III. TAKEOVER TECHNIQUES OVER TIME 
To set the scene further for historical analysis of the interrelation-
ship between share prices and the market for corporate control, we now 
provide a thumbnail sketch of different takeover techniques open to 
would-be acquirors of public companies.34 An initial distinction is be-
tween an acquisition of control by purchasing a majority of the voting 
stock, termed by Ronald Gilson and Alan Schwartz a ‘‘transfer by sale,’’35 
and obtaining control through a proxy fight, which the same authors re-
fer to as a ‘‘transfer by vote.’’36 
A. Transfer by Vote vs. Transfer by Sale 
A transfer by vote occurs when a party opposed by the incumbent 
directors achieves boardroom dominance by securing the backing of un-
affiliated shareholders through the solicitation of proxies.37 For an insur-
gent, a key advantage with a proxy contest as compared to a transfer by 
sale is that the financial outlay will probably be less because it will not be 
necessary to buy the shares constituting a controlling stake.38 On the 
downside, an acquiror who acquires control by way of a transfer by vote 
has to share with other shareholders any benefits generated by improved 
performance due to the change of control. In contrast, with a transfer by 
sale the acquiror will benefit exclusively, assuming the acquiror ultimate-
ly buys all of the target’s shares. Also, transfers by vote lack the finality 
of a transfer by sale. While the winner of a proxy contest will only retain 
control for as long as the shareholders continue to provide their backing, 
an acquiror who buys a majority voting stake should be able to control 
the company until they decide to sell out. 
                                                                                                                                         
 34. As Henry Manne noted in a well-known 1965 article introducing the notion of the ‘‘market 
for corporate control’’: ‘‘There are several mechanisms for taking over the control of corporations.’’ 
Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 114 (1965). 
 35. Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Sales and Elections as Methods for Transferring Corpo-
rate Control, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 783, 790 (2001).  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. 
 38. For a more detailed analysis of the trade-offs involved, see Armour & Cheffins, Origins of 
‘‘Offensive’’ Shareholder Activism, supra note 8, at 267--69.  
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B. Exchange vs. Cash Tender Offers 
As the conventional wisdom concerning takeover history spelled 
out in Part I implies, for present day readers, a transfer by sale connotes 
a tender offer. With a tender offer, target shareholders are invited to of-
fer (‘‘tender’’) their shares to the acquiror.39 The acquiror undertakes to 
pay tendering shareholders either in cash, with shares in itself, or some 
combination of the two. This undertaking will typically be conditional, 
with the acquiror reserving the right not to purchase any of the shares 
tendered if the number actually tendered does not equal the number the 
acquiror is seeking to purchase.40 
As between a cash and an exchange tender offer, the big advantage 
with the latter is that the bidder does not have to raise the funds required 
to buy the shares of those who tender.41 Cash tender offers, on the other 
hand, tend to be less complicated affairs than exchange tender offers. 
With an exchange tender offer, target company shareholders must take 
into account not only the price but also the bidder’s prospects when de-
ciding whether to accept. Consequently, the simplicity of cash can pro-
vide a compelling reason for a corporation attempting a hostile takeover 
to eschew an exchange offer.42 
Cash tender offers were also traditionally more straightforward to 
execute than exchange offers because of corporate and securities law. By 
virtue of state corporate law, shareholder approval was quite often re-
quired for the issuance of shares underpinning an exchange tender of-
fer.43 Moreover, between the mid-1930s and the enactment of the Wil-
liams Act in 1968,44 whereas a cash tender offer could be carried out 
without triggering disclosure obligations under federal securities law, the 
distribution of shares associated with a share-for-share exchange obliged 
the acquiring corporation to prepare, file, and distribute a prospectus di-
vulging business and financial data concerning both the acquiror and the 
target.45 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 39. A tender offer can also be made by a company to acquire its own shares, but this scenario is 
irrelevant to the market for corporate control. On types of tender offers, see DOUGLAS V. AUSTIN & 
JAY A. FISHMAN, CORPORATIONS IN CONFLICT------THE TENDER OFFER 3--4 (1970). 
 40. EDWARD ROSS ARANOW & HERBERT A. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE 
CONTROL 49 (1973); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate 
Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6 (1978).  
 41. Armour & Cheffins, Origins of the Market, supra note 3, at 1857--59 (indicating with a cash 
tender offer the cash has to be available).  
 42. Id. at 1856.  
 43. Arthur Fleischer, Jr. & Robert H. Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. 
PA. L. REV. 317, 348 n.119 (1967). 
 44. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 424 (1968).  
 45. Armour & Cheffins, Origins of the Market, supra note 3, at 1857.  
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C. Block Purchases vs. Open Market Bids 
The tender offer is not the only transfer by sale method available. 
For example, Henry Manne, in a famous 1965 article that introduced the 
concept of ‘‘the market for corporate control,’’ observed that of the tech-
niques for securing control, ‘‘[t]he most obvious is outright purchase on 
the open market of the requisite percentage of shares.’’46 This is what we 
characterize as an ‘‘open market bid.’’47 Unlike a tender offer, where a 
corporate acquiror can offer its shares as consideration, sellers of shares 
in an OMB necessarily receive cash. 
Where a corporation has a small number of shareholders who own 
collectively a majority stake, a bidder need not rely on the stock market. 
Voting control can instead be achieved by arranging off-market purchas-
es from those dominant shareholders (‘‘block purchases’’).48 With block 
purchases being individually negotiated and with voting control poten-
tially at stake, such deals are unlikely to be concluded at market prices. 
Absent some form of distress sale by the blockholders, the purchase 
price(s) will not be set below the prevailing share price. Instead, the price 
will usually be tailored to provide the vendors with a premium reflecting 
the fact they are transferring control of the company (Table 1). 
TABLE 1: VARIETIES OF TRANSFER BY SALE 
 Tender offer Open Market 
Bid 
Block purchases 




No No, for shares 
purchased on 




tion of control 
possible? 
Yes Yes No
Consideration Cash, shares or a 
combination of 
the two 









tual sale price 
will reflect a 
control  
premium 
                                                                                                                                         
 46. Manne, supra note 34, at 115--16. 
 47. An alternative formulation is ‘‘open market purchase of control.’’ See Yedidia Z. Stern, Ac-
quisition of Corporate Control by Numerous Privately Negotiated Transactions: A Proposal for the 
Resolution of Street Sweeps, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1195, 1195 (1993).  
 48. Manne, supra note 34, at 116 (noting that an acquiror can ‘‘try to buy the shares from large 
individual owners, thus preserving secrecy and allowing negotiation on price’’). 
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If a publicly traded company lacks a tight coalition of shareholders 
owning a dominant collective stake, then seeking to obtain voting control 
entirely by way of off-market block purchases will not be feasible. A 
general tender offer can make sense in such circumstances. Tender offers 
are, of course, also off-market purchases. A key distinction between a 
tender offer and the acquisition of control by deals struck with dominant 
shareholders is that there is no negotiation over price. Instead, the same 
offer is typically made simultaneously to all target shareholders on a 
‘‘take-it-or-leave-it’’ basis.49 
Where an acquiror is in a position to obtain voting control by pur-
chasing shares off-market from a tight coalition of investors, this can be 
thought of as a ‘‘friendly’’ acquisition. This is because that dominant coa-
lition should have the voting power necessary to persuade the board of 
directors to cooperate.50 We correspondingly exclude from our hostile 
acquisition dataset instances where a bidder sought to obtain control by 
way of off-market purchases from a coalition of shareholders with a con-
trolling stake.51 
D. Cash Tender Offers vs. OMBs 
A putative acquiror who decides to try to obtain control of a public 
company by paying cash to buy shares and who cannot rely on block pur-
chases will then need to choose between an OMB and a cash tender of-
fer. The relative attractiveness of an OMB versus a cash tender offer is 
barely explored in prior literature,52 so we will canvass the issue here. 
Our primary emphasis will be on the manner in which shares are priced. 
Other factors can, however, come into play, and we will consider these 
before turning to the interrelationship between OMBs, tender offers, and 
share prices. 
For an acquiror, an attractive feature of an OMB is that the pur-
chasing of shares can be spread out over time so as to permit the acquiror 
to use funds periodically accumulated (e.g. realized corporate profits), 
                                                                                                                                         
 49. We have already encountered one exception, this being where a bidder opts to increase the 
price on offer so as to improve the response from the shareholders. See supra note 5 and accompany-
ing text. Another will be where a corporation has more than one class of shares. The invitation may 
then contain multiple offering prices. ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 40, at 47.  
 50. Stern, supra note 47, at 1196 (making the point in a situation where there is a single majority 
shareholder but the same logic should apply if voting control is held collectively by a coalition of inves-
tors with whom the acquiror can negotiate).  
 51. Because off-market and on-market purchases can be combined in the acquisition of a con-
trolling stake this could make it difficult for us to categorize an acquisition transaction for the purposes 
of our dataset. We aimed to include only instances where a bidder could not obtain a majority stake by 
way of private negotiation and correspondingly needed to buy shares on the stock market to secure 
voting control. 
 52. The sole paper to consider the question directly of which we are aware is a 1990 article by 
Lloyd Cohen, who in turn notes that in prior literature there was ‘‘virtually no discussion in the litera-
ture of why raiders employ tender offers rather than open market purchases.’’ Cohen, supra note 25, at 
116--17. 
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thereby precluding any need to engage in external borrowing.53 In con-
trast, with a cash tender offer, the bidder has to be able to pay the entire 
purchase price for the target all at once.54 Also, with an OMB, the ac-
quiror does not have to pay cash immediately for any shares. The shares 
can instead be bought on margin, with the acquirer relying on credit from 
a broker or bank secured by reference to the purchased shares. Indeed, 
in the early decades of the 20th century, when the margin required of cli-
ents fell as low as 10%,55 a large block of stock could be bought with rela-
tively little capital.56 The Securities Exchange Act of 193457 mandated 
federal regulation of margin lending for securities, and initial margin re-
quirements clients had to meet subsequently rose to 50% or higher.58 As 
of the late 1950s, a broker or bank likely would have required a prospec-
tive acquiror to pay up front 90% of the price of the stock acquired.59 
Conversely, a potentially significant disadvantage with an OMB is 
the outcome if the campaign does not succeed. Under such circumstanc-
es, the acquiror might well end up with a substantial minority stake 
which could be difficult to unwind without putting substantial downward 
pressure on the share price. In contrast, because a tender offer can be 
made conditional on a specified percentage of shares being tendered,60 
the bidder has the option to walk away completely if the tender offer 
does not generate the hoped-for response.61 
Potentially the most important distinction between a tender offer 
and an OMB likely to influence the choice between the two is the price 
that will have to be paid for the shares. With a tender offer, target com-
pany shareholders are extremely unlikely to agree to sell if the price of-
fered is the same as the prevailing market price, which means that for a 
                                                                                                                                         
 53. Financial constraints would be more potent if an OMB was executed rapidly. In the opening 
decade of the twentieth century, OMBs involving railways were prevalent. Armour & Cheffins, Ori-
gins of the Market, supra note 3, at 1840--41. Railway companies of the era would go heavily into debt 
to raise money to buy stock in other railways. ALEXANDER DANA NOYES, THE MARKET PLACE: 
REMINISCENCES OF A FINANCIAL EDITOR 218 (1938). 
 54. AUSTIN & FISHMAN, supra note 39, at 4 (‘‘purchase . . . with cash’’). 
 55. The ‘‘margin’’ denotes the proportion of the price paid upfront by the purchaser, with the 
rest being funded by a loan secured on the stocks purchased. 
 56. H. S. MARTIN, THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 130--31, 137 (1919); Franklin Allen et al., 
Large Investors, Price Manipulation, and Limits to Arbitrage: An Anatomy of Market Corners, 10 REV. 
FIN. 645, 661 (2006). 
 57. 48 Stat. 881.  
 58. Simon Kwan, Margin Requirements as a Policy Tool?, FRBSF ECON. LETTER (Mar.  
24, 2000), http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2000/march/margin-
requirements-as-a-policy-tool/; Figure 1: Initial Margin Requirements, FRBSF, http://www.frbsf.org/ 
economic-research/publications/economic-letter/images/pdfcharts/ el2000-09a.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 
2015).  
 59. ROBERT SOBEL, THE LAST BULL MARKET: WALL STREET IN THE 1960S 63 (1980). 
 60. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.  
 61. But see Cohen, supra note 25, at 118--19 (arguing that if acquirors were alarmed by the possi-
bility of ending up a substantial minority shareholder they would have launched ‘‘naked’’ tender offers 
without first acquiring a sizeable stake in the target when in fact raiders typically bought up on average 
more than 20% of a target’s shares before launching a bid).  
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tender offer to succeed it will have to incorporate a control premium.62 
Estimates of the average bid premium for tender offers occurring be-
tween the 1960s and 1980s ranged between around 15% and 50%.63 
With an OMB, if the acquiror is able to secure control without the 
share price rising significantly, an OMB should work out cheaper than a 
tender offer. There is a big ‘‘if’’ involved, however, because the bidder’s 
share purchases may be expected to drive the share price up. For in-
stance, Samuel Hayes and Russell Taussig, who argued in a 1967 Har-
vard Business Review article that the cash tender offer was ‘‘the only 
quick, reasonably priced approach when resistance is expected,’’ said that 
successfully executing an OMB ‘‘may take years if a prohibitive run-up in 
the market price is to be avoided.’’64 
The likelihood of an OMB prompting a substantial increase in the 
target company’s shares will depend on the willingness of existing share-
holders to sell their shares at, or near, the current market price. If many 
will do so, then it could well be possible for the bidder to acquire a sizea-
ble and perhaps even controlling stake without driving up the share price 
materially. Under such circumstances, the supply curve of the target 
company’s stock would be flat, or perfectly ‘‘elastic,’’ illustrated by line S 
in Figure 1. When a supply curve is highly elastic, an increase in the 
quantity bought has little or no effect on the price the buyer-----in our case 
the acquiror-----must pay. For instance, with the perfectly elastic supply 
curve illustrated by line S an increase in the quantity demanded from q 
to q' results in no increase in the market price from p. 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 62. As Myles Mace and George Montgomery observed in 1962 in a book on corporate acquisi-
tions: ‘‘When the stock of a company to be valued for acquisition is listed, widely held and traded ac-
tively on an exchange or over-the-counter, the minimum total price for such an enterprise is generally 
greater than the total value determined in the market place. . . . To stockholders the quoted price on 
the market constitutes value and any offer less than what is believed to be value usually will be reject-
ed.’’ MYLES L. MACE & GEORGE G. MONTGOMERY, JR., MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS OF CORPORATE 
ACQUISITIONS 204 (1962).  
 63. Cohen, supra note 25, at 115; Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 690 (1988) 
[hereinafter Stout, Unimportance]. 
 64. Samuel L. Hayes, III & Russell A. Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Mar.--Apr. 1967, at 135, 136--37.  
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FIGURE 1: SUPPLY CURVES FOR SHARES IN TARGET COMPANIES 
 
As the elasticity of a supply curve decreases-----compare line S' with 
line S in Figure 1-----an increase in the quantity demanded in the market 
results in higher prices. Hence, an increase in demand from q to q' results 
in an increase in price from p to p'. Translating this insight to the market 
for corporate control, an investor seeking to use the stock market to buy 
voting control of a public company which has an inelastic supply curve 
for its shares will quickly find that it is necessary to pay more, and maybe 
much more, than what had been the prevailing market price to succeed. 
In theory, the supply curve for shares of companies could look like 
S in Figure 1.65 Assume, for instance, that investors do not buy a stock for 
its unique qualities. Instead, they buy shares and own them because the 
equity offers, at the market price, a fair return, adjusting for risk.66 With a 
stock market as well developed as that in the United States, there should 
be numerous close substitutes for a particular stock. A corporate finance 
maxim which follows from this is, ‘‘Seen One Stock, Seen Them All.’’67 
To the extent this maxim is true, companies will have shares with highly 
                                                                                                                                         
 65. Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit ‘‘Manipulation’’ in Financial 
Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 513--15 (1991). On other observers who have reputedly taken the 
point for granted, see Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair 
Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1242 n.40 (1990) [hereinafter Stout, Are Takeover].  
 66. RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 333 (10th ed. 2011). 
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elastic supply curves, which will benefit bidders undertaking an OMB.68 
To be sure, even if the supply curve for a company’s shares is highly elas-
tic, stock market buying might prompt a short-term share price bump be-
cause of liquidity constraints, such as when dealers temporarily struggle 
to find willing sellers because a stock is thinly traded.69 With this being a 
short-term effect, an acquiror may nevertheless ultimately be able to ac-
cumulate enough stock to gain control without a marked increase in 
price. 
The efficiency of the stock market could affect the willingness of 
shareholders to exit in a company undergoing an OMB and thereby in-
fluence the likelihood of success. We identify here three possible links. 
With each it is salient that, as we have just seen, a would-be acquiror who 
buys a large number of shares rapidly in the market could trigger at least 
a short-term increase in price owing to liquidity constraints, even if the 
supply curve is otherwise flat. Even with a temporary effect, the manner 
in which other investors react could mean that the price increase is sus-
tained in a way that makes an OMB considerably more costly and per-
haps untenable. 
The first link relates to how informed investors revise their esti-
mates of a stock’s value in response to an increase in price. Such inves-
tors may well use what they already know about the company to ‘‘de-
code’’ the information that the price increase signals. We may expect the 
response to be a function of what is already known about the target 
company. The less information that is public about the company, the 
wider the range of potential private information a price increase might 
signal. This will make it harder for informed investors to deduce whether 
an increase in the share price has arisen from trading by those with pri-
vate information indicating that the firm’s prospects have improved, or 
has occurred due to a buyer seeking to acquire a large and even control-
ling stake. Conversely, if a large volume of information has already been 
made public about a company, then identifying a bidder by way of price 
decoding should be easier for informed investors because they will have 
a reasonably reliable benchmark for evaluating whether the share price 
should be increasing. 
Regardless of how the price decoding has occurred, if informed in-
vestors deduce that there is a potential acquiror and that acquiror may be 
willing to pay considerably more than the current market price to buy the 
shares needed to obtain control, they will then be reluctant to sell out at 
or near the prevailing market price. This will create a steeper supply 
curve and a much more costly OMB. Extrapolating from this logic, we 
would predict that OMBs would become more costly as the amount of 
information made public about companies increases and is impounded in 
                                                                                                                                         
 68. Stout, Are Takeover, supra note 65, at 1242. 
 69. Fischel & Ross, supra note 65, at 515--16. 
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share prices. This, in turn, would be linked to a more fundamentally effi-
cient market.70 
A second link between stock market efficiency and investors’ will-
ingness to sell in the event of an OMB turns on the behavior of unin-
formed investors. 71 Such investors are unlikely to have faith in the veraci-
ty of share prices if the stock market does not adjust rapidly to changing 
information. As the stock market becomes increasingly informationally 
efficient, however, investors’ confidence in share prices should grow. As 
matters reach the point where all publicly available information is 
promptly impounded in shares, uninformed investors may reason that, 
because of the reliability of share prices, there is no reason to sell stock 
they own at the market price absent a pressing financial need or a plan to 
restructure their investment portfolio.72 This would result in companies 
having supply curves for shares that would be almost vertical (highly ine-
lastic). In the particular circumstances of an OMB, the increase in price 
triggered by a would-be acquiror’s buying of shares would generate a 
feedback loop whereby price increases arising from the buying would 
cause investors to ascribe a higher valuation to the shares, which in turn 
would prompt the price to rise further and so on. An OMB would then 
become too expensive to execute. It follows that OMBs are likely to be 
prohibitively costly when the stock market impounds potentially salient 
information promptly, or at least as so long as uninformed investors be-
lieve the stock market to be efficient.73 
Each of the two links we have considered by which an OMB might 
drive share prices upward depends on there being a noticeable price re-
action to which investors respond. If it is possible for an acquiror some-
how to acquire a sizeable percentage of a target’s shares without any 
price increase, then no such reactions should be triggered. This paves the 
way for the third potential link between stock market efficiency and in-
vestors’ willingness to sell in the event of an OMB. 
A way in which an acquiror could preclude the share price of a tar-
get from rising significantly would be to engage in market manipulation 
so as to stop any upward movement. If OMBs were causing sharp in-
creases in the share price of targets because of decoding by informed in-
vestors, market manipulation could short circuit the upward price swing 
by preventing those investors from deducing that an OMB was occurring. 
If, on the other hand, OMBs were causing share prices to increase dra-
matically because of faith that uninformed investors had in the veracity 
of shares prices, market manipulation could preclude the share price in-
creases that would lead shareholders to believe their companies had in-
creased in value. More generally, if market manipulation was widespread 
                                                                                                                                         
 70. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 71. Cohen, supra note 25, at 127--29.  
 72. Id.; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.  
 73. This is because the mechanism turns on investors’ beliefs about the accuracy of the stock 
price.  
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this could undermine faith investors would otherwise have in share prices 
and flatten the supply curves of shares for all companies. Under any of 
these circumstances, OMBs could succeed with the bidder paying little 
more than the pre-OMB price for the shares. Conversely, if market ma-
nipulation was difficult to achieve, OMBs could readily become too cost-
ly to be viable. 
If OMBs drive share prices upwards because uninformed investors 
have faith in share prices as a measure of fundamental value, and if mar-
ket manipulation cannot be used effectively to preclude a price increase, 
then for an acquiror, a tender offer may be an attractive alternative to an 
OMB. A tender offer would signal to these uninformed investors that 
they had an opportunity to secure an ‘‘extraordinary’’ payout which 
could only be achieved by tendering their shares74 and correspondingly 
should disregard what they would otherwise assume to be the most 
trustworthy signal of intrinsic value, namely the price at which the shares 
were trading. The point that the bidder would be seeking to drive home 
is that the price the bidder was offering did not reflect the underlying 
value of the corporation in current hands-----the pre-tender offer share 
price would be the appropriate metric if this state of affairs continued-----
but rather the value of the company if and when control changed hands.75 
In a scenario where the buying of shares associated with an OMB 
would tend to drive up share prices sharply due to decoding by informed 
investors, a tender offer could again be helpful tactically. What a tender 
offer could do would be to help to cap the size of the control premium 
that the acquiror would have to hand over. This could be done most ef-
fectively through an element of coercion. If the acquiror only made an 
offer for a subset of the target’s shares that remained large enough to de-
liver control, investors would infer that delaying the decision to tender 
might have serious adverse consequences.76 They would know that they 
could lose the opportunity to exit with a control premium and that, if the 
bid succeeded without them having tendered, they would be minority 
shareholders in a public company which the acquiror dominated. The ac-
quiror could then obtain the shares considerably more cheaply than if 
this takeover technique was not available.77 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 74. Cohen, supra note 25, at 129--36.  
 75. Id. at 129.  
 76. John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the 
Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1205 (1984). 
 77. Id. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS 
A. Methodology 
Having canvassed the various types of takeovers and identified ways 
that share price efficiency could be relevant to their deployment, we now 
turn to the evidence from our dataset on the evolution of different modes 
of control contest over the period 1900 to 1965. We compiled our time 
series by using the ProQuest Historical Newspapers database, which 
permits full-text searches of stories in major U.S. newspapers. We fo-
cused on those papers most salient for announcements about corporate 
control contests, namely the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, 
and (to a lesser extent) the Washington Post. 
In earlier work, we used the ProQuest Historical Newspapers data-
base to compile time series of proxy contests, OMBs, and tender offers 
affecting U.S. public companies for the period 1900--1949.78 For this 
study, being aware of the conventional wisdom that the market for cor-
porate control took on its modern form in the 1950s and 1960s, we ex-
tended these datasets to 1965.79 We compiled data on hostile takeovers 
encompassing four different techniques for obtaining control: OMBs, 
cash tender offers, exchange tender offers, and proxy contests. In each 
case, we sought to identify relevant transactions by entering a combina-
tion of search terms and then read the articles which were identified. The 
articles were then assessed individually to determine their relevance to 
our enquiries. 
In reading through the newspaper articles we identified, we dis-
counted reports that were described as ‘‘rumors’’ unless a control contest 
was confirmed by a subsequent story. We also excluded transactions in 
which the acquiror was seeking to acquire less than control, whether be-
cause they were only seeking to buy a sizeable minority of the voting 
shares or obtain minority representation on the board.80 Finally, only 
transactions that we could confirm were hostile, typically determined by 
whether the transaction was opposed at least initially by the target’s di-
rectors, were included in our dataset. Regardless of the stance the board 
took, we treated transactions as friendly where the bidder sought or ob-
tained voting control by negotiating off-market private purchases of 
shares with a dominant shareholder coalition.81 For those transactions 
that qualified for our dataset, we identified the insurgent’s relationship 
                                                                                                                                         
 78. Armour & Cheffins, Origins of ‘‘Offensive’’ Shareholder Activity, supra note 8, at 270; Ar-
mour & Cheffins, Origins of the Market, supra note 3, at 1839. 
 79. Setting the end point of the data collection to 1965 was based on pragmatic considerations, 
namely a substantial increase in the number of ‘‘hits’’ using our search strategies in the years immedi-
ately following.  
 80. In the case of an OMB or a tender offer, we typically equated ‘‘control’’ with a majority of 
voting rights but treated newspaper reports indicating that ‘‘working’’ or ‘‘effective’’ control was at 
stake as being equivalent. In the case of a proxy fight, we took ‘‘control’’ to mean a majority of the 
board of directors.  
 81. For more details on the logic, see supra notes 50--51 and accompanying text.  
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(if any) with the target and ascertained whether control was successfully 
acquired. 
Due to a paucity of empirical work on hostile takeovers occurring 
prior to the 1960s, our dataset provides a fruitful and indeed unique de-
parture point for understanding the historical development of the market 
for corporate control. Nevertheless, there are clear limitations on the in-
ferences that can be drawn from our data. One is that we could only un-
cover details of control transactions which received newspaper coverage. 
This likely biased the results towards larger companies, the activities of 
which would be the most newsworthy. We have no way of knowing the 
extent of this bias or how it evolved over time. 
Another limitation is that our searches would only identify attempt-
ed takeovers that generated stories that contained the search terms we 
relied upon. Designing suitable search criteria for our purposes was chal-
lenging given the evolution in takeover tactics and language used to de-
scribe them over two-thirds of a century. Consequently, for each tech-
nique for obtaining control, we developed and deployed search protocols 
that encompassed numerous ways of referring to the same underlying 
transaction.82 
B. Data 
1. Overall Frequency of Control Contests 
For 1900--65, we identified a total of 346 instances where an ac-
quiror sought to obtain a controlling stake in a public company by a 
transfer by sale. Of these 346, 92 were OMBs, 152 were cash tender of-
fers, and 102 were exchange tender offers. Given that we defined OMBs 
as involving attempts by bidders acting on their own initiative to com-
mence a campaign to buy sufficient shares on the stock market to acquire 
control,83 all 92 were ‘‘hostile.’’ Of the 152 cash tender offers, we uncov-
ered evidence of board opposition on 55 occasions. Hostility was rarer 
with exchange tender offers, with only 11 instances where there was 
managerial opposition. Overall, then, we identified 158 occasions be-
tween 1900 and 1965 where there was an attempted transfer by sale that 
was hostile in nature. 
Instances where an insurgent merely sought to obtain board control 
were more common overall than attempts to carry out a transfer by sale. 
Between 1900 and 1965, we identified 398 proxy contests where the pro-
tagonists were seeking to obtain control of the board. Transfers by vote 
                                                                                                                                         
 82. For OMBs, we searched for ‘acquire* w/20 control OR secure* w/20 control OR gain* w/20 
control OR obtain* w/20 control OR attempt* w/20 control AND ‘‘open market’’ AND stock OR 
shares.’ For cash tender offers, we searched for ‘‘tender AND offer AND (control OR merger) AND 
(share OR stock).’’ For exchange tender offers, we searched for ‘‘tender AND offer AND (control OR 
merger) AND (share OR stock) AND exchange.’’ For proxy contests, we searched for ‘‘‘proxy fight’’ 
OR ‘‘proxy battle’’ OR ‘‘proxy contest’’ OR ‘‘proxy solicitation’’ OR ‘‘consent solicitation’’ OR ‘‘solicit 
proxies’’ OR ‘‘soliciting proxies’’ OR ‘‘solicitation of proxies.’’’ 
 83. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.  
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correspondingly modestly outnumbered attempts to secure transfers by 
sale by 398 to 346, but did so by more than a two-to-one ratio (398 to 
158) once the focus is restricted to hostile takeovers. 
Hostile control transactions were not distributed equally across the 
decades we focus on. Instead, while there was substantial year-to-year 
variation, they generally became more common as time went along. Fig-
ure 2, which charts the total number of hostile control transactions year-
by-year by aggregating all four time series, illustrates the point. 
FIGURE 2: ALL CONTROL CONTESTS, 1900-65 
 
Notes. ‘‘Control contests’’ includes sum of hostile tender offers (whether exchange or cash), open 
market bids for control, and proxy fights launched for board control of U.S. publicly-traded companies 
identified through searches of ProQuest Historical Newspapers. Data for proxy fights for board control 
from 1956-65 are from SEC Annual Reports. 
2. Transfers by Sale vs. Transfers by Vote 
Having identified aggregate hostile takeover trends, we consider 
now how matters evolved with each of the takeover techniques we focus 
on. Figure 3 plots the annual data on tender offers without discriminating 
on the basis of the form of consideration offered. It also plots data on 
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FIGURE 3: CONTROL CONTESTS, 1900--65 (RAW NUMBERS) 
 
Notes. ‘‘Hostile offers’’ comprises the sum of hostile cash tender offers and hostile exchange tender 
offers. ‘‘Proxy contests’’ comprises proxy contests for board control. ‘‘Open market bids’’ comprise 
transactions in which acquiror seeks to obtain control of target company by purchasing controlling 
stake in the market. All identified through searches of ProQuest Historical Newspapers.  
 
With the number of control contests growing generally over time, it 
is hard to draw conclusions from Figure 3 about the relative incidence of 
different types of control contest. To correct for this, Figure 4 presents 
the same data expressed as proportions of the total annual tally of hostile 
control contests. A striking point which emerges from this is the relative 
ubiquity of proxy fights for control. Not only did instances where pro-
spective acquirors sought to execute a transfer by vote substantially out-
number transfers by sale between 1900 and 1965, but other than years 
clustered at the very beginning of the twentieth century and the late 
1920s, only very rarely did proxy battles constitute a minority of all hos-
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FIGURE 4: CONTROL CONTESTS, 1900--65 (PROPORTIONS BY TYPE) 
 
Notes. ‘‘Hostile offers’’ comprises the sum of hostile cash tender offers and hostile exchange tender 
offers. ‘‘Proxy contests’’ comprises proxy contests for board control. ‘‘Open market bids’’ comprise 
transactions in which acquiror seeks to obtain control of target company by purchasing controlling 
stake in the market. All identified through searches of ProQuest Historical Newspapers.  
 
Figure 4 also reveals that transfers by sale were restricted almost 
exclusively to the 1900s, 1920s, 1950s, and 1960s. This broadly corre-
sponds with the periods in which there was substantial merger activity.84 
Conversely, the periods in which transfers by sale were a rarity-----the 
1930s and 1940s-----were decades in which mergers were much less fre-
quent. The pattern is a logical one. Hostile takeovers executed by a 
transfer by sale are a species of merger so it is hardly surprising that the 
relative importance of this method of acquiring companies declined 
markedly when merger activity was in the doldrums generally. 
3. OMBs vs. Tender Offers 
Having drawn attention to trends concerning transfers by sale and 
transfers by vote, we now consider transfers by sale in more detail. We 
begin by comparing OMBs and tender offers, whether cash or share ex-
change based. Figure 5 provides evidence on the annual incidence of 
OMBs and tender offers and reveals a strong time trend. In the opening 
                                                                                                                                         
 84. We have made this point previously, focusing on OMBs and mergers occurring between 1900 
and 1950. See Armour & Cheffins, Origins of the Market, supra note 3, at 1840. The data we relied on 
then and now to ascertain the number of mergers was drawn from Klaus Gugler et al., The Determi-
nants of Merger Waves 41 (Univ. of Vienna Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. SP II 2006-01), availa-
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decades of the twentieth century, the OMB was the technique of choice 
of acquirors seeking to execute a transfer of control by sale. This was no 
longer the case, however, by the 1950s. By this point in time, the tender 
offer was clearly eclipsing the OMB. 
FIGURE 5: TRANSFERS BY SALE: OMBS VS HOSTILE TENDER OFFERS 
Notes. “Open market bids” comprise transactions in which acquirer seeks to obtain control of target company 
by purchasing a controlling stake in the market. “Hostile offers” comprise the sum of hostile cash tender offers 
and hostile exchange tender offers. All identified through ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 
4. Hostile Tender Offers: Cash Bids vs. Exchange Offers 
Figure 6 illustrates the relative frequency of hostile cash versus ex-
change tender offers between 1900 and 1965. In our dataset, hostile ten-
der offers do not become a meaningful part of control contests until the 
1950s (Figure 4). We found only a tiny number of pre-1940 hostile tender 
offers, each of which was an exchange offer.85 We omit these from Figure 
6 in order to focus on the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. Figure 6 
indicates that exchange offers were used less frequently than cash offers 
between 1950 and 1965 to carry out hostile bids. There was no strong 
time trend; cash offers substantially outnumbered exchange offers in 
each and every year. 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 85. The pre-1940 exchange tender offers we found by way of our searching had Nevada Consoli-
dated Copper Co. (1910) and All America General Corporation (1930) as targets. There may also 
have been an exchange tender offer launched in 1901 to obtain control of American Bridge Co. See 
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FIGURE 6: HOSTILE TENDER OFFERS: CASH VS. EXCHANGE 
OFFERS, 1950--65 
 
Notes. ‘‘Cash offers’’ comprises hostile cash tender offers and ‘‘Exchange offers’’ comprises hostile 
exchange tender offers. All identified through searches of ProQuest Historical Newspapers.  
5. Relationship of the Acquiror to the Target Company 
A final issue upon which our data sheds light is the identity of the 
acquiror seeking to carry out a transfer by sale. A hallmark of the 1980s, 
when hostile takeovers reached their zenith, was the prominence of the 
financial buyer who was in the business of acquiring and selling compa-
nies and therefore not strongly wedded to a particular industry.86 This 
was presaged by post-World War II trends. Figure 7 reveals a clear in-
crease in the 1950s and 1960s of the proportion and number of hostile 
transfers by sale outsiders launched. 
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FIGURE 7:  RELATIONSHIP OF ACQUIRER AND TARGET INDUSTRY:  
CONTESTED TRANSFERS BY SALE, 1900--65 
 
Notes. ‘‘Contested transfers by sale’’ comprises sum of hostile OMBs, hostile cash tender offers and 
hostile exchange tender offers. All identified through searches of ProQuest Historical Newspapers.  
C. Using Share Price Trends to Explain Our Data-----Theoretical 
Conjectures and Preliminary Observations 
The manner in which shares are priced and securities markets func-
tion can plausibly impact upon the market for corporate control in vari-
ous ways. We offer a series of conjectures of this nature here, identifying 
in so doing those which are substantiated in a preliminary way by our his-
torical data. This will set the stage for us to consider the development of 
share prices from 1900 through the 1960s and ultimately permit us to 
draw conclusions about linkages between share price trends and the de-
velopment of the market for corporate control. 
1. Overall Frequency of Control Contests 
Between 1900 and 1965, there was a general trend towards more 
hostile takeovers being launched over time (Figure 2). The manner in 
which shares were priced potentially could explain this pattern because 
perceptions of stock prices may affect the willingness of potential ac-
quirors to launch a control contest. Takeovers-----especially hostile ones-----
are always a risky proposition. Where share prices, however, are thought 
of as providing few clues on where a company stands, a hostile takeover 
will be very much a leap in the dark. In contrast, if share prices are re-
garded as informationally efficient (they incorporate rapidly pertinent 
information) and fundamentally efficient (they are a reliable barometer 
of firm value under current management), acquirors should have faith in 
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spondingly, if between 1900 and 1965, share prices were becoming more 
efficient in these senses, then this should have encouraged control con-
tests.87 
Part V’s analysis of the historical development of share prices will 
consider the extent to which the efficiency of share prices-----
informational and fundamental-----increased as the twentieth century pro-
gressed. To anticipate, the evidence is mixed, but due to changes such as 
the enactment of federal securities regulation in the mid-1930s, the effi-
ciency of the stock market might well have increased over time. To the 
extent this occurred, the process logically should have fostered hostile 
takeover activity. This would explain the time trend we see with the 
number of takeover contests. 
Two caveats are required. First, the upward trend with control con-
tests could be a product of an increase in the total number of listed com-
panies over time. After all, more companies mean more potential targets. 
The number of stock issues listed on the New York Stock Exchange did 
increase from 377 in 1900, to 1,308 in 1931, and 1,472 in 1951.88 On the 
other hand, data compiled by the Securities & Exchange Commission 
(‘‘S.E.C.’’) indicate that the number of companies listed on national stock 
exchanges actually declined between the mid -1930s and 1950 before in-
creasing in the 1950s and 1960s.89 
A second caveat relates to ownership patterns. A hostile takeover is 
only possible in the absence of a dominant shareholder who can exercise 
a de facto veto over a takeover, whether structured as a transfer by sale 
or transfer by vote.90 There was a general trend in favor of ownership 
dispersion in U.S. public companies from 1900 into the 1960s,91 which 
should have set the scene for additional control contests. Corresponding-
ly, the growth in the number of hostile control contests reflected in Fig-
ure 2 could be as much a result of a growing separation of ownership and 
control as much as changes to the pricing of shares. 
2. Transfers by Sale vs. Transfers by Vote 
For those control contests that go ahead regardless of the efficiency 
of share prices, the manner in which shares are priced might still be ex-
pected to affect a putative acquiror’s choice between trying to win a 
proxy contest and seeking to acquire a majority of the shares. In an envi-
ronment where a potential bidder surmises that a public company is a 
promising takeover target but lacks faith in the share price as a measure 
                                                                                                                                         
 87. See Fox et al., supra note 18, at 340 n.24 (arguing that enhanced disclosure and a resulting 
increase in price accuracy makes the market for corporate control more robust).  
 88. ROSS, supra note 17, at 158; CHARLES AMOS DICE & WILFORD JOHN EITEMAN, THE STOCK 
MARKET 336 (1952).  
 89. Brian R. Cheffins et al., Questioning ‘Law and Finance’: US Stock Market Development, 
1930--70, 55 BUS. HIST. 598, 602--03 (2013).  
 90. Armour & Cheffins, Origins of the Market, supra note 3, at 1842. 
 91. Brian Cheffins & Steven Bank, Is Berle and Means Really a Myth?, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 443, 
449--58 (2009).  
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of the company’s value, the bidder might well prefer to proceed without 
making the substantial financial outlay associated with buying enough 
shares to obtain a controlling interest. Their fallback position would be 
to seek to gain control of the corporation by securing dominance of the 
board via a proxy contest. It follows that, during the period we focus on 
that, so long as potential bidders lacked faith in the veracity of share 
prices of potential targets, transfers by vote would have dominated trans-
fers by sale. The outcome should have begun to reverse itself as confi-
dence in share prices grew. 
Let us assume-----quite plausibly as our historical investigation will 
indicate-----that in the early twentieth century share prices were less in-
formative and reliable barometers of firm value than they would be in 
later decades. Given the foregoing logic, any bias in favor of acquiring 
control by a transfer by vote should have diminished over time. Our data 
does not support this conjecture. As we have seen (Figure 4), attempts to 
secure control by way of proxy contests outnumbered control contests 
oriented around the acquisition of shares throughout the entire period 
we focus on. Further research is required to explain the sustained popu-
larity of proxy contests as a means of acquiring control of companies. 
3. OMBs vs. Tender Offers 
A switch in takeover tactics from OMBs to hostile tender offers 
(Figure 5) is the most striking time trend revealed by our data. Changes 
in how shares were priced plausibly help to explain the pattern. Assume, 
for instance, that the supply curve for a company’s shares is highly elas-
tic, which would normally mean a bidder could quietly buy up shares on 
the market without driving up the share price.92 Due, however, to thin 
trading, the bidder’s activities in fact cause the company’s share price to 
begin to climb. The efficiency of the stock market could strongly influ-
ence what happens next. To draw out specific conjectures, we refer to the 
three links Part III.D identified between the operation of the stock mar-
ket and investors’ willingness to sell their shares in a company undergo-
ing an OMB. 
Consider initially the role of disclosure. If a target company engages 
only in rudimentary disclosure, investors will assume that there is a sub-
stantial range of private price-sensitive information concerning the com-
pany’s prospects.93 The company’s share price climbs abruptly due to an 
OMB. Investors might conclude that ‘‘insiders’’ with access to the private 
information have re-evaluated the company’s situation and bought 
shares accordingly. This inaccurate price decoding would mean the OMB 
would remain confidential, increasing the likelihood of success. 
Now assume a target company engages in extensive disclosure of in-
formation salient to investors. In this situation, the share price plausibly 
                                                                                                                                         
 92. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 93. See supra note 69 and text following.  
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would reflect with reasonable accuracy the firm’s prospects and private 
price sensitive information should be relatively uncommon. Assuming 
the target company had not divulged public information that would justi-
fy a reappraisal of its future prospects, informed investors following the 
company’s share price could then quite reasonably attribute a sharp in-
crease in price to an OMB rather than the buying up of shares by insiders 
or professional investors with access to inside information. The informed 
investors then might well purchase shares anticipating to profit from sell-
ing out to the bidder. Under such circumstances, they logically would be 
reluctant to sell their shares unless the price offered was substantially 
above the pre-OMB share price. The result would be a steeply upward-
sloping supply curve that could preclude a successful OMB. Bidders, be-
ing aware of this possibility, might well forego an OMB in favor of a ten-
der offer. As our historical analysis will demonstrate, the amount of 
company-specific information impounded in share prices increased sub-
stantially as the twentieth century progressed, which, under the foregoing 
logic, should have increasingly discouraged OMBs over time. This, in 
turn, could help to explain the OMB/tender offer time trend we have 
identified. 
Consider now the role of uninformed investors’ perceptions of the 
informational efficiency of the stock market. Assume uninformed inves-
tors believe that share prices are ‘‘accurate’’ and correspondingly have, 
absent personal financial circumstances, no investment-related reason to 
exit by selling on the market.94 OMBs would be very challenging to exe-
cute because a paucity of investors willing to sell at the market price 
would mean the bidder would have to address an upward-sloping or, 
perhaps, even near-vertical supply curve. 
If investors lack faith in the efficiency of share prices, everything 
changes. With investors not being wedded to share price as a measure of 
what companies are worth, they should be on the lookout for opportuni-
ties to sell shares at an advantageous price. The supply curve for shares 
would correspondingly be reasonably flat, meaning an OMB could well 
be feasible. It follows that if investors developed greater faith in the effi-
ciency of share prices from the opening of the twentieth century through 
to the 1960s, this might have helped to close the door on the OMB in a 
way that was consistent with our data. However, as we shall see in Part 
V.D, our historical analysis provides little support for this conjecture. 
There is another way in which the pricing of shares could help to 
explain the marked shift from OMBs to tender offers we have docu-
mented. Regardless of the shape the supply curve for shares of targets 
would otherwise have, a bidder carrying out an OMB who can engage in 
market manipulation to disguise successfully what is occurring will have a 
greater chance of success.95 To the extent that market manipulation is 
discouraged, bidders should begin forsaking OMBs, presumably in favor 
                                                                                                                                         
 94. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 95. See supra note 73 and text following.  
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of tender offers. Hence, if market manipulation was more difficult to en-
gage in during the 1950s and 1960s than it was as the twentieth century 
opened, this too could account at least partly for the dramatic shift from 
OMBs to tender offers our data reveal. Our historical analysis does sup-
port this market-manipulation related conjecture. 
4. Hostile Tender Offers: Cash Bids vs. Exchange Offers 
A corporate bidder who is going to seek to secure control of a com-
pany by purchasing a majority of the shares and opts to carry out a ten-
der offer still has a choice whether to offer investors cash or its shares as 
consideration. Growing faith in the veracity of share prices should in 
theory favor the use of exchange tender offers. With an exchange tender 
offer, a stockholder in the target company evaluating the offer has to 
take into account not only how any premium offered relates to the pric-
ing of the target company’s shares, but also the reliability of the bidder’s 
share price as a measure of the intrinsic value of the bidder. All else be-
ing equal, stockholders in a target company should be more willing to 
tender their shares in an exchange offer as their confidence increases in 
the veracity of the bidder’s share price. Improvements in stock price effi-
ciency over time should in turn be associated with an upward trend in ex-
change offers as compared to cash offers. Given, however, that our data 
on cash bids versus exchange offers betray no obvious time trend (Figure 
6), it does not appear that changes in the efficiency of share prices de-
termined bidders’ choices along this particular dimension. 
5. Relationship of the Acquiror to the Target Company 
The manner in which shares are priced might be expected to affect 
the types of persons who are willing to seek control of target companies. 
Takeovers are always a risky proposition, but the uncertainties involved 
will be much greater if potential acquirors have little faith in the veracity 
of share prices of potential targets and lack basic financial data for the 
companies in question. Under such circumstances potential acquirors will 
likely be insiders or at least parties with private information regarding 
the prospects of potential targets. 
An obvious example of a bidder likely to have access to salient pri-
vate information concerning a potential target would be a firm in the 
same industry. A firm operating in the same line of business as a prospec-
tive target should have a nearly unique opportunity to observe at close 
range how the target has been performing. This could make a major dif-
ference where the prospective target company has an uninformative 
share price due to limited disclosure because its competitor would be 
better able to make sense of its position its than would entirely unrelated 
bidders. Consequently, we might expect more efficient stock prices, sup-
ported by more extensive public disclosure by companies, to trigger a 
greater willingness on the part of ‘‘outsiders’’-----non-industry partici-
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pants-----to launch acquisitions. Our data indicate that it was considerably 
more common for outsiders to seek to buy voting control in the 1950s 
and 1960s than was the case as the twentieth century opened (Figure 7). 
To the extent that our analysis of the historical development of share 
prices indicates that, between 1900 and the mid-twentieth century, a 
more substantial range of information concerning prospective targets was 
being impounded in share prices and would have become available to 
bidders, this provides a highly plausible explanation of the time trend we 
have found. We turn to this historical analysis now. 
V. SHARE PRICES AND TAKEOVERS-----HISTORICAL TRENDS 
We have now generated a series of conjectures concerning the rela-
tionship between share prices and the market for corporate control and 
have assessed the extent to which they are consistent with our hand-
collected data on takeovers covering 1900 to 1965. Some of the hypothe-
sized links between share prices and the market for corporate control do 
not receive any support, but the manner in which shares have been 
priced does provide potentially plausible explanations for (1) an increase 
in the number of control contests occurring over time, (2) the growing 
involvement of ‘‘outsiders’’ in the market for corporate control, and (3) 
our most pronounced empirical result: the dramatic shift from OMBs to 
tender offers. To explore matters further, and in particular to seek to dis-
tinguish the effects of the various posited links between the efficiency of 
share prices and the market for corporate control, we will now consider 
the development of share prices during the period our dataset covers. 
Given the ECMH’s centrality to understanding the manner in which 
shares are priced, our historical analysis focuses initially on the emer-
gence of the intellectual framework for the ECMH in the 1950s and 
1960s. We then explore the evolution over the period 1900 to 1965 of var-
ious preconditions for, and indicia of, stock market efficiency that may 
be relevant, in the ways we have conjectured, to the market for corporate 
control. In particular, we consider the amount of information being im-
pounded into share prices, empirical evidence on stock market efficiency, 
investors’ perceptions of stock prices, market reactions to OMBs, and fi-
nally market manipulation and its regulation. 
A. The Emergence of the ECMH 
Precepts underpinning the ECMH first gained intellectual currency 
as the 1950s drew to a close, just as the most striking time trend revealed 
by our data (the displacement of the OMB by the tender offer) occurred. 
This may not have been a coincidence. If investors believe the stock 
market is efficient, then this can result in a steep supply curve for shares 
that will make it more difficult for a bidder to execute an OMB success-
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fully.96 Was articulation of the ECMH associated with a change in the 
way in which shares were priced or a change in the perception of veracity 
of share prices that impacted upon takeover techniques? To put our as-
sessment of this issue in context, we provide now a thumbnail sketch of 
the early development of the ECMH and its potential impact on inves-
tors. 
A 1959 article by University of Chicago academic Harry Roberts 
became the catalyst for the ‘‘random walk’’ hypothesis that underpins the 
weak form of the ECMH.97 Roberts, who demonstrated that weekly 
changes in the Dow Jones Industrial Average for the year 1956 strongly 
resembled weekly levels of random numbers, knew he was challenging 
received wisdom. As he observed in his 1959 article, many financial ana-
lysts engaged in technical analysis of stock prices and believed ‘‘that the 
history of the market itself contains ‘patterns’ that give clues to the fu-
ture, if only these patterns could be properly understood.’’98 
In 1964, Lawrence Fisher and James Lorie published empirical find-
ings generated from a new historical database of share prices complied 
by the Chicago-based Center for Research in Security Prices (‘‘CRSP’’) 
that indicated not only that stocks outperformed bonds over time, but al-
so that the same stock market returns would have been generated by an 
investor who simply chose shares at random rather than by reference to 
past share price fluctuations or financial data companies had disclosed.99 
Fisher and Lorie’s findings concerning stock selection strategy anticipat-
ed the semi-strong form of the ECMH, in that investors apparently could 
skip detailed analysis of fundamentals and rely on share prices to reflect 
all relevant available information. As Lorie said to the Wall Street Jour-
nal, their study ‘‘seem(ed) to suggest’’ that ‘‘the routine type of financial 
information isn’t likely to prove profitable.’’100 Fisher and Lorie’s 1964 ar-
ticle was ‘‘a bombshell’’ that captured the attention of the media as well 
as numerous academics and market professionals.101 One critic even 
claimed that their research and the resulting press coverage had spread a 
‘‘cult of ignorance,’’ oriented around the idea that ‘‘knowledge of securi-
                                                                                                                                         
 96. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.  
 97. Harry V. Roberts, Stock-Market ‘‘Patterns’’ and Financial Analysis: Methodological Sugges-
tions, 14 J. FIN. 1 (1959). On the significance of Roberts’ work, see Meir Statman, Normal Investors, 
Then and Now, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.--Apr. 2005, at 31, 32. Work done by Louis Bachelier, a French 
mathematician, in the early twentieth century anticipated key aspects of the ECMH but was ignored 
until well into the 1950s. See PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF 
MODERN WALL STREET 18--23 (2005).  
 98. Roberts, supra note 97, at 1.  
 99. Lawrence Fisher & James H. Lorie, Rates of Return on Investments in Common Stocks, 37 J. 
BUS. 1 (1964).  
 100. Study Shows ‘Random’ Stock Investment From ’26 to ’60 Had 3-to-1 Chance of Profit, WALL 
ST. J., May 25, 1965, at 10.  
 101. BERNSTEIN, supra note 97, at 129--30 (describing the article as a ‘‘bombshell’’); Leo Barnes, 
What Difference Does Knowledge Make to Investors?, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.--Oct. 1965, at 60, 61 
(quoting press reports). For examples of initial press reports of the findings ultimately published, see 
William Clark, U. of C. Study Puts Common Stocks in Illustrious Class, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 2, 1963, at E5; 
J. A. Livingston, Hard to Go Wrong with Common Stocks?, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1963, at B15; Austin 
C. Wehrwein, Study by Chicago U. Finds Market Bullish, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1963, at 73.  
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ties, financial fundamentals, and investing techniques makes little if any 
difference to the results achieved.’’102 
Eugene Fama, also working under the auspices of the CRSP, pub-
lished research soon after that followed up on Fisher and Lorie’s work in 
two significant ways. First, in a 1965 article, he pioneered use of the term 
‘‘efficient’’ to characterize a stock market where a series of stock price 
changes had no memory and where new information was reflected ‘‘in-
stantaneously’’ in actual prices.103 A few years later, he developed the 
terms ‘‘weak,’’ ‘‘semi-strong,’’ and ‘‘strong’’ efficiency to describe these 
properties of securities markets with greater precision.104 
Second, Fama implicitly equated ‘‘informational’’ efficiency with 
‘‘fundamental’’ efficiency. He said that in  
An ‘efficient’ market . . . where there are large numbers of rational 
profit-maximizers actively competing, with each trying to predict fu-
ture market values of individual securities, and where important 
current information is almost freely available to all participants . . . 
at any point in time the actual price of a security will be a good es-
timate of its intrinsic value.105 
Lorie echoed this view in a 1966 interview discussing Fama’s research, 
saying that given intense efforts made to study the stock market, ‘‘the 
price is a reasonably fair representation of the basic value of the stock. It 
relieves you and me of the necessity of being intelligent.’’106 
Fama’s 1965 article, like Fisher and Lorie’s research, attracted con-
siderable attention. Fama was profiled in a series of business publications 
and appeared on television to discuss his work.107 He subsequently 
acknowledged that ‘‘[i]nsofar as you can become famous for writing an 
article in an academic journal, I became famous.’’108 Numerous securities 
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 108. SMITH, supra note 107, at 201.  
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analysts and fund managers were dismissive of the EMCH research,109 
but others were intrigued.110 As Peter Bernstein said in a 2005 book on 
the impact financial economics had on the investment community, in the 
1960s, ‘‘Wall Street was still reluctant to listen, but by the end of the dec-
ade the sound of the distant drummers on the campuses had become so 
loud that investors could no longer ignore it.’’111 
With the publicity generated by research indicating that share prices 
constituted a ‘‘good estimate’’ of the intrinsic value of companies, it is 
conceivable that the work done by Fama et al. in the late 1950s and the 
first half of the 1960s may have coincided with stock prices becoming 
more efficient, or bolstered faith in the efficiency of share prices, or both. 
This could have helped to change uninformed investors’ perceptions of 
share prices in a way that made OMBs difficult to execute. To explore 
this possibility and other potential links between share prices and the 
market for corporate control, we now turn to evidence regarding the 
manner in which shares were priced between 1900 and the mid-1960s. 
We begin with an assessment of the nature and scope of information that 
was being impounded in share prices over time. 
B. What Information Was Being Impounded in Share Prices? 
It has been said of the early twentieth century that it is unclear 
‘‘whether it is even proper to think in terms of our current understanding 
of market efficiency, or security pricing or transaction volume in such an 
environment.’’112 A dearth of company specific disclosures lends credence 
to this view. Due to a combination of federal and state laws at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, railroads were publicly divulging more in-
formation than modern firms sometimes disclose. 113 In contrast, operating 
in an environment generally bereft of disclosure regulation, publicly 
owned industrial companies of this era provided very limited financial 
information to investors.114 A balance sheet and an income statement 
were usually included in published financial reports, but otherwise the 
quality and quantity of information supplied varied greatly.115 According 
to a 1926 article on balance sheet construction,  
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So notorious are the omissions from the balance sheets of certain 
large industrial corporations that the outsider is led to wonder if it is 
really the desire of the management responsible for them to cover 
up facts which, should they be disclosed, might give too much in-
formation to the stockholder or to the general reader.116 
The disclosure related discrepancy between railroads and industrial 
companies plausibly affected the manner in which shares were priced. 
According to a 1903 report in the New York Times, there was a general 
sense that major industrial companies were undervalued as compared 
with railways.117 The failure of industrials to ‘‘stand up and be counted 
with the railroads’’ was said to have resulted partly from their not being 
‘‘in the habit of making such reports as the railroads.’’118 
Also instructive is the behavior of share prices of companies traded 
on the New York Stock Exchange (‘‘NYSE’’) in the midst of a 1907 fi-
nancial crisis.119 As the financial crisis unfolded, shares of railways and 
utilities traded with a substantially lower bid-ask spread than shares of 
mining and manufacturing firms.120 This was due in large measure to the 
fact that in a panicky market strongly influenced by rumors, investors 
could, in a way they could not with mining and manufacturing compa-
nies, assess railways and utilities objectively by using accounting infor-
mation these firms were compelled to publish by regulation.121 
Disclosure by industrial companies gradually became more robust 
during the opening decades of the twentieth century. For instance, the 
NYSE began in 1900 to require newly listed companies to provide an in-
come statement and balance sheet annually.122 After 1910, it expanded 
the requirements to oblige such firms to provide interim financial re-
ports, to comply with audit requirements, and to disclose on an ongoing 
basis fresh information potentially important to investors.123 Still, the 
change was not an abrupt one. By 1933, all companies listed on the 
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NYSE were being audited by a chartered public accountant, all compa-
nies were specifying current liabilities and assets in the balance sheets 
they made available, and nearly two out of three companies were provid-
ing data on sales.124 Nevertheless, during the 1920s, the NYSE did not 
oblige listed companies to report their profits, and a majority of compa-
nies listed on the ‘‘Big Board’’ failed to offer shareholders full financial 
statements with information on items such as sales, interest costs, and 
dividends paid.125 
While the NYSE ultimately fostered improved corporate disclosure 
over time, its influence was restricted to companies that sought a full list-
ing on the Exchange. Until 1910, companies could have their shares ad-
mitted to trading on the NYSE through its Unlisted Department without 
furnishing any financial information.126 Companies could also side step 
the NYSE disclosure requirements by arranging to have their shares 
traded on regional stock exchanges such as those in Chicago, Boston, and 
Pittsburgh, or by making provisions for trading on ‘‘over-the-counter’’ 
markets.127 William Ripley, a Harvard economist whose writings on the 
stock market in the 1920s attracted widespread attention,128 said of public 
companies not listed on the NYSE that their shares ‘‘remain[ed] more 
completely under control of its own management as respects market 
price.’’129 A 1934 study of securities markets by the Twentieth Century 
Fund said similarly of such companies ‘‘corporation reporting [was] es-
sentially inadequate to the proper functioning of the market.’’130 
By the 1920s, there was growing awareness that the value of shares 
depended primarily on the future earnings potential of public companies 
and that analysis and interpretation of what companies reported provid-
ed a key means for ascertaining a company’s prospects.131 Given, howev-
er, that during the opening decades of the twentieth century many public 
companies were not providing investors with the financial data necessary 
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for careful analysis of share prices,132 what sources of information did in-
vestors rely upon to determine earning power? Dividends were treated 
as very important, with investors assuming that dividend track records 
provided objective guidance on future payouts to shareholders.133 Early 
twentieth century investors also consulted newspapers, financial maga-
zines, and market letters circulated by brokerage firms to gain a sense of 
trends likely to affect a company’s industry and the stock market more 
generally.134 The business news press was sufficiently active by 1900 to 
communicate substantial information on general economic trends to 
readers and also engaged in independent ferreting and analysis of indus-
try developments.135 
If investors relied merely on published sources, this would have de-
layed the repricing of shares in response to salient information. The tele-
graph technology of the time meant, however, that reports concerning 
specific industries and core economic trends relevant to the stock market 
could be impounded very quickly in share prices. As the New York 
Times indicated in 1909, ‘‘[t]he race for news in Wall Street to-day is still 
more keen because the great increase in the general command of infor-
mation makes it more difficult for the man in Wall Street to outstrip his 
fellows.’’136 News tickers played a significant role in this context. These 
were machines that relied on telegraph technology to provide subscribers 
with distilled real-time access to company and industry specific infor-
mation and general news that could influence a particular company or 
industry, or financial markets as a whole.137 
The news ticker was a cousin of the stock ticker. Stock tickers, 
which, as with news tickers, were rented to subscribers, printed infor-
mation concerning stock exchange dealings on a tape, with transactions 
occurring on the New York Stock Exchange generating data on the 
number of shares sold and the price per share.138 According to a 1901 
newspaper report focusing on shares of companies traded on the NYSE, 
by virtue of stock tickers, ‘‘six seconds after a sale, a bid or an offer on 
the ‘floor,’ particulars [were] known’’ in the offices of 1000 members of 
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the exchange as well as 1000 non-members.139 The NYSE sought, assert-
ing property rights over quoted prices, to preclude use of tickers by non-
members to trade off the exchange using up-to-date NYSE quotes.140 
Nevertheless, by the early 1920s, there were just over 7,000 ribbon tape 
tickers in the U.S., most of which were used to relay stock prices, and this 
number increased to nearly 13,000 by the late 1920s.141 Newspapers also 
disseminated a substantial amount of information on stock exchange 
dealings, with roughly one-tenth of newspaper matter estimated to relate 
to stock exchange transactions as of 1919.142 
Stock tickers and newspaper reports of share price fluctuations 
would have facilitated price decoding, which again involves inferring 
otherwise unavailable firm-specific information from trading patterns of 
shares.143 A 1928 guide to the stock market described in a chapter on 
‘‘tape reading’’ how practitioners of the art relied on stock tickers in this 
manner: 
[T]he ticker records immediately the transactions of those who 
know the facts, and the tape reader sees the effects on stock prices 
and acts according to the clues there given. The tape tells the news 
accurately and in plenty of time for the tape reader to get into the 
market before the news comes out.144 
 While price decoding operated as a mechanism of market efficiency 
during the opening decades of the twentieth century, investing based on 
direct analysis of financial data seemingly was primitive. The New York 
Society of Securities Analysts, which by 1963 had nearly 3,000 members, 
was only founded in 1937 by approximately 20 analysts and had only 82 
members as of 1939.145 Indeed, it is arguable that the job title ‘‘securities 
analyst’’ would not have been understood prior to the mid-1930s.146 A 
1934 text on the stock market indicated that stockbroking firms had in-
augurated market advisory services to provide subscribers with recom-
mendations on the timing of buying and selling of particular shares.147 On 
the other hand, the staff generating these reports often were mere infor-
mation clerks rather than a statistician or economist of significant stand-
ing.148 
To what extent had matters improved by the 1950s, the decade 
when tender offers began to supplant OMB and it became commonplace 
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for ‘‘outsiders’’ to launch takeover bids (Figure 7)? The sources of data 
and news that informed investors could rely upon were much the same as 
they were in the late 1920s and early 1930s, including corporate financial 
reports, the stock ticker, newspapers, financial publications, and broker-
age letters.149 The enactment of federal securities legislation in the mid-
1930s, however, potentially made corporate reporting considerably more 
informative. The Securities Act of 1933150 required public disclosure of 
material financial information about public offerings companies made, 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934151 imposed substantial recurring 
disclosure requirements on companies with shares already listed on stock 
exchanges. The author of a guide to the stock market who emphasized 
that investors could not work intelligently without full information and 
said in the 1928 edition of reports issued by public companies ‘‘the in-
formation is still very incomplete’’152 indicated in the 1952 edition that the 
requirements of the 1934 Act had reinforced New York Stock Exchange 
rules governing disclosure and ‘‘greatly improved the situation.’’153 More-
over, according to a 1963 survey of the development of financial report-
ing in U.S. manufacturing companies, ‘‘businessmen . . . rapidly improved 
their financial reporting practices in response to the direct pressure of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission.’’154 
Various caveats need to be borne in mind, however, with the impact 
federal securities legislation had on corporate disclosure up to the 1950s. 
First, rules in the 1934 Securities Exchange Act mandating the disclosure 
of financial data only applied to issuers with shares traded over-the-
counter when the total market capitalization of securities issued exceed-
ed specified levels.155 Second, even for companies where disclosure was 
mandated, the full impact of reform likely was delayed.156 S.E.C. staff 
needed to gain experience with the disclosure regime, and private parties 
had to become familiar with the new arrangements.157 Perhaps because of 
this, securities regulators initially afforded considerable latitude to those 
preparing accounting documentation, resulting-----according to a 1998 his-
tory of accounting in the United States-----‘‘in very little change in 
pre/post-SEC reporting relationships.’’158 Indeed, a study by two S.E.C. 
attorneys of balance sheets and income statements filed by nationally 
prominent corporations in 1937 found ‘‘[r]eports to stockholders, wheth-
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er judged by the standards set by the SEC or by one’s own lights, seem 
very inadequate.’’159 
Third, with those public companies subject to requirements to dis-
close financial information on a periodic basis, it was unrealistic to expect 
ordinary investors to access the data directly because it was only availa-
ble for inspection in Washington D.C. and the offices of national stock 
exchanges.160 Indeed, a 1963 Wall Street Journal report indicating 
‘‘[l]iterally tons of (‘officially filed information’) fills row after row of fil-
ing cabinets at S.E.C. headquarters’’ suggested a lack of intense demand 
for much of the data: 
[T]he focal point for much of the essential transfer of financial data 
to securities-buyers is a cramped reference room in SEC headquar-
ters here that, by actual count, provides just 20 chairs for America’s 
17 million investors. What’s more only rarely is there great demand 
for the seats.161 
Even making due allowance for these caveats, a wider range of 
company-specific information should have been impounded in share 
prices in the 1950s and 1960s than was the case during the opening dec-
ades of the twentieth century. For instance, even if the typical investor 
did not analyze S.E.C. filings, there was a specialized cadre of profes-
sionally informed investors that did so. Two S.E.C. attorneys said of fil-
ings by public corporations in a 1939 law review article that ‘‘brokers, 
large scale and institutional investors do obtain the information filed, and 
their judgment on the value of the security, presumably reflected in its 
market price, affords the ordinary investor some protection.’’162 Moreo-
ver, by the 1950s, Standard & Poor’s (‘‘S&P’’) was drawing upon the 
world’s largest private financial library to publish for subscribers a con-
stantly updated loose-leaf compendium covering 6,000 companies, and 
S&P kept those subscribers abreast of recent corporate affairs and busi-
ness developments by drawing upon reports by S&P field staff and re-
ports from dozens of newspapers, magazines, and trade journals.163 
Evidence marshalled by Jeffrey Gordon further confirms that more 
information was reflected in share prices during the 1950s and the 1960s 
than was the case beforehand.164 Gordon identified various reasons why 
stock prices incorporated a growing amount of firm-specific information 
between 1950 and 2005, and a number were operative in the 1950s and 
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1960s.165 For instance, disclosure of vastly greater amounts of data, as 
measured by pages of documentation companies filed with the S.E.C., 
commenced during the 1960s.166 This was associated with a dramatic 
surge in ‘‘professionally informed’’ trading, evidenced by a quadrupling 
of the number of securities analysts between 1950 and 1967, which should 
have fostered the impounding of the growing amount of data in share 
prices.167 The proportion of shares owned by institutional owners, who 
unlike retail investors would invest on a sufficiently large scale to make 
effective use of securities research, also tripled from 11% in 1955 to 33% 
in 1970.168 Moreover, while the personal computer would not feature in 
investing until the 1980s,169 by 1967, there were over 100 subscribers for 
an S&P service that offered securities analysts access to computers that 
crunched data on hundreds of companies almost instantaneously from 
earnings reports and balance sheets.170 
The fact that more firm-specific information became available in the 
1950s and 1960s to those inclined to investigate plausibly would have af-
fected the identity of those undertaking takeover bids. In particular, as 
Part IV.C.5 described, potential acquirors that lacked a prior connection 
to their potential targets that could have left them concerned they did 
not know enough to proceed should have become more willing to step 
forward. Correspondingly, it should not be surprising that our data indi-
cate that the absolute number, and the proportion, of hostile transfer by 
sale deals launched by outsiders was considerably higher in the 1950s and 
1960s than it was in the opening decades of the twentieth century. 
For reasons canvassed in Part IV.C.3, the growing amount of firm-
specific information in circulation in the 1950s and 1960s also might have 
affected the choice of takeover tactics. Informed investors, for instance, 
plausibly would have been better able to determine whether price 
movements arose from an OMB rather than trading based on favorable 
non-public news concerning the target. Successful decoding of OMBs 
plausibly could have prompted a shift to tender offers because reluctance 
by informed investors to sell out in anticipation of further buying by the 
bidder would have created for the acquirors steeply upward-sloping 
                                                                                                                                         
 165. Trends that Gordon identified that only began after the 1960s and thus would not have had 
an impact during the time period on which we are focusing included a substantial bolstering of the 
S.E.C. public company disclosure rules, amendments to accounting standards that prompted more 
informative corporate disclosure and the rise of the personal computer, which drastically reduced the 
cost of information processing. See id. at 1548--62.  
 166. Id. at 1545--47.  
 167. Id. at 1561. 
 168. Id. at 1562, 1568.  
 169. The first stock market information service that operated by way of a table-top computer with 
a TV-like screen was first marketed in late 1979. AP, Dow Jones to Offer Home and Office Quote Re-
trieval Service, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1979, at D15.  
 170. Dana L. Thomas, Electronic Investing: Computers Are Making Decisions These Days on Wall 
Street, BARRON’S, Aug. 14, 1967, at 47. Statistics concerning the companies were stored on a magnetic 
tape data bank. On the challenges associated with putting historical financial data into tape-readable 
form see Dana L. Thomas, Computers and Investors: Electronic Brains Are Making Remarkable Ad-
vances in Security Analysis, BARRON’S, June 22, 1964, at 44.  
CHEFFINS-ARMOUR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2016 11:13 AM 
No. 3] MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 803 
share supply curves that greatly reduced the likelihood of success. With 
uninformed investors, the growing amount of firm-specific information 
that was publicly available conceivably might have bolstered their faith in 
the veracity of share prices, which again could have fostered steep supply 
curves for shares that would have hindered OMBs and fostered tender 
offers. While plausible, historically-related empirical evidence on stock 
market efficiency, which we discuss next, provides only mixed support 
for these conjectures. 
C. Historically Oriented Empirical Evidence on Stock Market Efficiency 
Given the changes occurring to corporate disclosure throughout the 
course of the first half of the twentieth century and into the 1950s and 
1960s, it might well have been expected that share prices would have 
been more efficient in the 1950s and the 1960s than they were previously. 
The available empirical evidence, while not extensive,171 suggests a 
somewhat different story. This, in turn, casts doubt on the extent to 
which changes to the pricing of shares affected the choice between 
OMBs and tender offers. 
With respect to informational efficiency, a 1973 study of the impact 
of the enactment of federal securities legislation indicated that stock 
prices fit the pattern of a random walk equally well for eight years prior 
to the enactment of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act as for the six years 
following.172 This implies that stock prices met the standard of weak form 
efficiency immediately prior to as well as following the federal revamp of 
securities law. As for semi-strong efficiency, event studies of market re-
actions to news announcements by early twentieth century U.S. public 
companies show that in this era share prices impounded available rele-
vant news very rapidly in the way that reputedly occurs now. For in-
stance, with friendly corporate acquisitions carried out during a merger 
wave occurring between 1897 and 1903, share prices of companies being 
acquired increased rapidly and substantially in the modern fashion when 
a prospective merger was announced.173 In addition, for industrial com-
panies traded on the NYSE between 1905 and 1910, dividend increases, 
dividend cuts/omissions, and announced earnings decreases were associ-
ated with quick and significant price revisions.174 Announced earnings in-
creases only prompted significant positive returns for companies that 
were paying dividends, perhaps reflecting the fact that, for investors, pos-
                                                                                                                                         
 171. Kian-Ping Lim & Robert Brooks, The Evolution of Stock Market Efficiency Over Time: A 
Survey of the Empirical Literature, 25 J. ECON. SURVS. 69, 71 (2011) (‘‘[t]here is little literature that 
examines the degree of time-varying market inefficiency. . . .’’).  
 172. Benston, supra note 124, at 144, 152.  
 173. Banerjee & Eckard, supra note 135 (finding as well that prices declined rapidly in circum-
stances where a merger was a ‘‘fait accompli’’ in the first news report, seemingly reflecting disappoint-
ment on the part of investors that insiders had successfully captured all prospective gains before the 
public announcement). 
 174. Sivakumar & Waymire, supra note 122, at 65. 
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itive earnings reports lacked credibility unless backed by dividend pay-
ments.175 
Support for the proposition that early twentieth century U.S. stock 
markets were informationally efficient, or at least as informationally effi-
cient as stock markets in the 1950s and 1960s, also comes from studies 
with a longer time dimension. The studies in question were done by An-
drew Lo176 and by Anthony Gu and Joseph Finnerty.177 This research, 
which casts doubt on whether U.S. stock markets have ever been weak-
form informationally efficient, indicates that the extent to which prices 
departed from a ‘‘random walk’’ was no greater during the opening half 
of the twentieth century than was the case subsequently. The method 
used was to ascertain the nature and extent of autocorrelation, which ex-
ists when past performance or past patterns predict future movements. If 
share prices are engaged in a random walk, then they should be serially 
uncorrelated.178 The empirical studies by Lo and by Gu and Finnerty in-
dicated that this tended not to be the case during the opening half of the 
twentieth century, but crucially for our purposes, this was not a depar-
ture from the historical norm. 
Lo, who examined monthly returns of the S&P composite index 
from 1871 to 2003, anticipated that indeed stock markets would have be-
come more efficient in the weak form sense over time.179 He hypothe-
sized that his measure of autocorrelation ‘‘might be expected to take on 
larger values during the early part of the sample and become progres-
sively smaller during recent years as the U.S. equity market becomes 
more efficient.’’180 What he instead found was that the degree of 
(in)efficiency varied through time in a cyclical fashion, with autocorrela-
tion levels for the decades between 1900 and 1950 not being markedly 
different than those in subsequent decades.181 This implies there was no 
secular trend towards ‘‘weak form’’ stock market efficiency over time. 
Gu and Finnerty’s findings similarly cast doubt on whether share 
prices became more informationally efficient between 1900 and the 
1950s. They analyzed the daily index of the Dow Jones Industrial Aver-
age from 1896 to 1998, conjecturing in so doing that advances in infor-
mation technology would help to increase weak-form market efficiency 
over time.182 Their hypothesis was contradicted, in that while there was 
                                                                                                                                         
 175. Id. at 64.  
 176. Andrew W. Lo, The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis: Market Efficiency from an Evolutionary 
Perspective, 30(5) J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 15 (2004) [hereinafter Lo, Evolutionary Perspective]; Andrew 
W. Lo, Reconciling Efficient Markets With Behavioral Finance: The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis, 7(2) 
J. INVESTMENT CONSULTING 21 (2005) [hereinafter Lo, Reconciling].  
 177. Anthony Yanxiang Gu & Joseph Finnerty, The Evolution of Market Efficiency: 103 Years 
Daily Data of the Dow, 18 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 219 (2002). 
 178. Lo, Evolutionary Perspective, supra note 176, at 25; Lo, Reconciling, supra note 176, at 35--36.  
 179. Lo, Evolutionary Perspective, supra note 176, at 16. 
 180. Id. at 25.  
 181. Id. fig. 1; Lo, Reconciling, supra note 176, at fig. 2. The market was at its most ‘‘efficient’’ in 
the 1950s (i.e. the autocorrelation co-efficient was very close to zero), but the autocorrelation co-
efficient was similarly low as the twentieth century got underway.  
 182. Gu & Finnerty, supra note 177, at 220.  
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autocorrelation present during numerous years between 1896 and 1998, 
this trend was considerably more pronounced between the early 1940s 
and mid-1970s than it was either before or after.183 This implies that, as 
compared with the opening decades of the twentieth century, the stock 
market was less efficient after the introduction of federal securities regu-
lation and during the period when the ECMH was developed than it was 
in other eras.184 
The evidence is somewhat more contradictory with studies of stock 
price accuracy-----fundamental efficiency rather than informational effi-
ciency. In a 2000 article, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung, and Wayne Yu 
investigated the extent to which, in a given month between 1926 and 
1995, stock prices and shareholder returns (including dividends) of a 
randomly selected sample of 400 U.S. stocks moved together with the 
stock market generally.185 They found the general pattern was for the 
fraction of stocks moving up and down together to decline over time.186 A 
logical inference to draw is that stock prices became less ‘‘synchronous’’ 
over time because more firm-specific information was being impounded 
in the share prices of individual companies.187 This in turn would imply an 
increase in stock price accuracy, plausibly due to an expanded range of 
publicly available firm-specific information. 
During the course of the twentieth century, the combined enact-
ment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 likely was the most significant catalyst for increased disclosure by 
companies, so it might have been anticipated that share prices would 
have been markedly less ‘‘synchronous’’ thereafter. The time trend re-
vealed in Morck et al.’s data only became pronounced, however, after 
1950.188 Moreover, when Paul Mahoney and Jianping Mei compared the 
impact of earnings reports on a variety of stock exchange metrics (share 
turnover, bid-ask spreads, ‘‘no trade’’ days, and share price volatility), 
they found that the size of the reactions were not significantly different 
before (1927) the enactment of federal securities laws than after (1935).189 
                                                                                                                                         
 183. Id. at 225. Unpublished research by William Egan on autocorrelation patterns affecting the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1929 to 2007 indicates there typically was a negative correlation 
from 1929 to 1940 and a strong tendency towards a positive correlation thereafter. William J. Egan, Six 
Decades of Significant Autocorrelation in the U.S. Stock Market (Jan. 20, 2008) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088861.  
 184. Gu & Finnerty, supra note 177, at 219, 225--27.  
 185. Randall Morck et al., The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging Markets 
Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 215 (2000).  
 186. Id. at 220--22.  
 187. Artyom Durnev et al., Does Greater Firm-Specific Return Variation Mean More or Less In-
formed Stock Pricing?, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 797, 834--35 (2003) (saying of the implications of their analysis 
for U.S. historical data reported by Morck et al., supra note 185, ‘‘[o]ur findings also suggest that high-
er firm-specific stock returns may also reflect more informationally efficient stock prices in the United 
States.’’). 
 188. Gordon, supra note 164, at 1543--44 (discussing Morck et al.’s findings and saying the time 
trend had arisen ‘‘particularly since 1950’’).  
 189. Paul G. Mahoney & Jianping Mei, Mandatory vs. Contractual Disclosure in Securities Mar-
kets: Evidence from the 1930s, 25--28 (Feb. 2006) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=883706. 
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Taken together, these findings are consistent with the historical evidence 
suggesting that even if federal securities legislation had an impact on the 
pricing of shares of public companies, this effect was delayed.190 
In contrast with Morck et al.’s findings, Robert Shiller’s analysis of 
share price movements poses a challenge to the idea that there was any 
increase in the accuracy of share prices as the twentieth century pro-
gressed. Based on a dataset he compiled of share price, earnings, and div-
idend data for companies in the S&P composite index from the 1870s to 
the 1980s,191 Shiller reported that throughout this entire period the stock 
market fluctuated much more dramatically than would have been antici-
pated given plausible expectations concerning dividends192 or the actual 
dividend payments the companies subsequently made.193 This consistent 
pattern of ‘‘overvolatility’’ suggests that the extent to which stock prices 
failed to reflect the fundamental value of companies, as measured by ac-
tual or expected cashflows to investors, was as substantial in the second 
half of the twentieth century as the first half.194 
Taken together, the key point emerging from the various historical-
ly-oriented share price studies is that they show no strong time trend in 
favor of share price efficiency as the twentieth century progressed.195 In-
deed, Shiller’s ‘‘overvolatility’’ analysis suggests share prices were less ac-
curate during a ‘‘bull’’ market in the 1960s and early 1970s than was the 
case beforehand.196 The only partial exception to the trend is the research 
by Morck et al., which again implies that from 1950 onwards, share prices 
were more accurate than they had been in prior decades. 
How do we reconcile Morck et al.’s findings with the other chrono-
logically oriented empirical evidence concerning share prices? This is 
relatively straightforward with the studies measuring ECMH. As we have 
indicated, share prices can be informationally efficient even if publicly 
                                                                                                                                         
 190. See supra notes 156--59 and accompanying text. 
 191. The year-by-year data and the sources drawn upon are set out in chapter 26 of ROBERT J. 
SHILLER, MARKET VOLATILITY (1989).  
 192. John Y. Campbell & Robert J. Shiller, Stock Prices, Earnings, and Expected Dividends, 43 J. 
FIN. 661 (1988). A study of expectations concerning dividends and share prices that found a considera-
bly better ‘‘fit’’ than Shiller similarly did not reveal any sort of time trend in favor of greater efficiency 
over time. See Robert B. Barsky & J. Bradford De Long, Bull and Bear Markets in the Twentieth Cen-
tury, 50 J. ECON. HIST. 265, 271 (1990) [hereinafter Barsky & De Long, Bull and Bear].  
 193. Robert J. Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in 
Dividends?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 421 (1981).  
 194. See, e.g., Stout, Unimportance, supra note 63, at 697--98.  
 195. The studies cited here typically do not provide a detailed time-trend analysis. Instead, the 
evidence on time trends typically consists of charts plotting fluctuations in actual share prices and pric-
es that would have been anticipated based on the ‘‘fundamentals’’ input chosen. See, e.g., SHILLER, 
supra note 191, at 168--69, 363; Campbell & Shiller, supra note 192, at 673--74; Barsky & De Long, Bull 
and Bear, supra note 192, at 270--71; Shiller, supra note 193, at 422; Robert B. Barsky & J. Bradford 
De Long, Why Does the Stock Market Fluctuate?, 108 Q. J. ECON. 291, 292, 294 (1993). Shiller, howev-
er, did provide a statistical time trend analysis of the relationship between the dividend/price ratio and 
share prices in SHILLER, supra note 191, at 35. He said ‘‘[t]he efficient markets hypothesis thus appears 
to be dramatically wrong from this regression: stock prices move in a direction opposite to that indi-
cated by the dividend-price ratio. This is true in every subperiod examined.’’  
 196. N. Gregory Mankiw et al., An Unbiased Reexamination of Stock Market Volatility, 40 J. FIN. 
677, 685--86 (1985).  
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available information is scant.197 To reiterate, in circumstances where 
publicly available information concerning corporations traded on the 
stock market is rudimentary, the information which is available may be 
incorporated rapidly and fully in share prices in the manner contemplat-
ed by the semi-strong form of the ECMH without share prices constitut-
ing a reliable measure of the intrinsic worth of companies upon which in-
vestors are likely to rely reflexively. Correspondingly, it is possible that 
share prices were just as efficient informationally in 1910 as in 1960, even 
though the nature and quality of the information being impounded was 
inferior in 1910. 
Reconciling Morck et al.’s findings with Shiller’s results is more 
challenging because the subject matter is the same, namely fundamental 
efficiency. Still, the different results may simply reflect the measurement 
of different things. Recall that Shiller’s research was concerned with 
market-wide stock price movements relative to movements in actual, or 
expected, payouts to investors, whereas Morck et al. were focusing on in-
dividual share price movements relative to general stock market trends. 
Morck et al. were interested in the position of particular companies in re-
lation to companies collectively, assuming in so doing that less co-
movement of share prices was evidence of the impounding of more firm-
specific information in the share prices of individual companies. Shiller, 
in contrast, focused on excess volatility, which plausibly will result from 
trading strategies likely to affect the market at large. It may well be the 
case that investors were able to discriminate better between firms over 
time using more substantial information in the manner suggested by the 
findings of Morck et al., while still being afflicted with the same biases 
that affect the volatility of prices market-wide. Hence, there may have 
been some improvement in the efficiency of share prices in relation to 
each other while due to general trading patterns stock prices collectively 
remained a less than ideal indicator of future corporate performance. 
Taken together, the historically related empirical research on the ef-
ficiency of stock markets indicates that less changed between the begin-
ning of the twentieth century and the 1960s than might have been ex-
pected. Nevertheless, the changes that did occur might have been 
relevant to the choice of takeover tactics. It appears that stock prices in 
the 1950s and 1960s did not impound new public information much more 
quickly than was the case as the twentieth century opened and that col-
lectively at market level stock prices did not become a more reliable ba-
rometer of fundamental value. These trends suggest that uninformed in-
vestors would have had little reason to put greater store in share prices 
during the mid-twentieth century than would have been the case as the 
twentieth century began. As we will see in the next part of the Article, 
investors’ beliefs about the veracity of stock prices in fact did not change 
markedly, in large measure because they had considerable faith in share 
                                                                                                                                         
 197. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  
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prices even before the ECMH attracted attention. This all indicates that 
it is unlikely that the shift to tender offers we document occurred be-
cause OMBs had become difficult to execute due to growing trust in 
share prices among uninformed investors creating steeper supply curves 
for shares. 
On the other hand, the historically related empirical research on 
share prices does leave open the possibility that in the 1950s and 1960s 
investors relied on the growing amount of public information available 
on companies to discriminate more effectively between particular com-
panies when buying and selling shares. To the extent that this was occur-
ring, informed investors logically would have been able to decode more 
effectively price movements that could be traced to an OMB. If these in-
vestors did in fact become more adept at identifying OMBs and then re-
frained from exiting at the market price because they anticipated further 
buying by the bidder, this would have fostered upward-sloping supply 
curves for shares that would have discouraged bidders. The scene then 
conceivably was set for tender offers to dominate OMBs. 
D. Market Participants’ Perceptions of Share Prices 
Given that the tenets of the EMCH were not formulated formally 
until the 1960s,198 it might have been thought that early twentieth century 
investors would have had little reason to believe that share prices of pub-
lic companies provided the best available estimate of value of those 
companies. Matters then conceivably would have changed as familiarity 
with the ECMH grew. Greater faith in share prices in the 1960s amongst 
uninformed investors would in turn have fostered the steeper supply 
curves for shares that would have discouraged OMBs and prompted bid-
ders to rely on tender offers. 
While this efficiency based explanation of the switch to tender of-
fers is potentially plausible, the evidence concerning investor perceptions 
of share prices tells a different story. While the ECMH only emerged in 
the 1960s, faith in the veracity of share prices extends back much earlier. 
George Gibson wrote in 1889 in The Stock Markets of London, Paris and 
New York that when ‘‘shares become publicly known in an open market, 
the value which they acquire may be regarded as the judgment of the 
best intelligence concerning them.’’199 Fifteen years later, the New York 
Times acknowledged that share prices ‘‘may be influenced by speculative 
conditions for the time being’’ but emphasized that ‘‘stocks in the end 
rise upon values.’’200 
A claim by Samuel Untermeyer, counsel for a 1912--13 congression-
al investigation of an alleged Wall Street ‘‘money trust,’’ in a 1915 Ameri-
                                                                                                                                         
 198. See supra Part V.A.  
 199. GEORGE GIBSON, THE STOCK MARKETS OF LONDON, PARIS AND NEW YORK 11 (1889), 
quoted in ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 172 (2000).  
 200. True Basis of Values, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1905, at 13.  
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can Economic Review article that ‘‘the pretended market prices of securi-
ties of our greatest corporations have been ‘rigged’ and manipulated at 
the will of a handful of gamblers and operators’’201 elicited in response 
characterizations of the stock market similar to those of Gibson and the 
New York Times. Albert Atwood, who had collaborated on a 1911 book 
on investment and speculation,202 said ‘‘the great fundamental changes in 
prices on the Exchange . . . have been due to the changes in the value of 
the properties the stocks represented.’’203 Henry Emery, a Yale economist, 
said similarly of stock exchange prices that they, ‘‘whether proved right or 
wrong in the future, do represent with exactness what we all think 
now.’’204 W.C. Van Antwerp concurred in a 1914 guide on the stock mar-
ket, saying of an investor and NYSE share prices: 
The [stock] ticker gives him instantaneous quotations. These quota-
tions are not a one-man affair but the combined judgment of thou-
sands of experts, bulls and bears, bankers and brokers, speculators 
and investors, all over the world. The price thus established is not 
merely the opinion of the all these minds as to values to-day, but 
that it represents a critical look into the future.205 
Similar faith in share prices was expressed even in the midst of the 
grueling ‘‘bear’’ market that followed the 1929 stock market crash. Ac-
cording to a 1930 survey of the functioning of the stock exchange, ‘‘[t]he 
fundamental cause for changing prices is, of course, changing values. . . . 
Speculation merely intervenes to adjust present prices to future but 
seemingly probable values.’’206 A 1934 guide to the stock market indicat-
ed similarly ‘‘[e]xchange markets represent the collective mind of the in-
vestment world as to values, present and prospective. And in this connec-
tion it is all important to remember that the collective judgment is much 
more reliable than the judgment of an individual.’’207 
This sort of faith in share prices as a barometer of the intrinsic value 
of companies was by no means universally held. For instance, during the 
1930s, Benjamin Graham, co-author of a leading guide on analysis of se-
curity prices, maintained that shares were only worth buying at the stock 
market price if that price was below liquidation value and if the corpora-
tion had good prospects.208 Economist Wayne Leeman also offered a 
                                                                                                                                         
 201. Samuel Untermeyer, Speculation on the Stock Exchanges and Public Regulation of the Ex-
changes, 5 AM. ECON. ASS’N (supplementary issue) 24, 41 (1915). Untermeyer was counsel for a con-
gressional sub-committee chaired by Arséne Pujo.  
 202. CONWAY, supra note 136, at iii.  
 203. Albert W. Atwood, Speculation on the Stock Exchanges------Discussion, 5 AM. ECON. ASS’N 
(supplementary issue) 86, 86 (1915) (emphasis in original). 
 204. Henry C. Emery, Speculation on the Stock Exchanges and Public Regulation of the Exchang-
es, 5 AM. ECON. ASS’N (supplementary issue) 69, 78 (1915) (emphasis in original). 
 205. VAN ANTWERP, supra note 134, at 22--23; see also id. at 26, saying that if securities of railway 
companies were trading for a considerable period of time at a low level, ‘‘it shows investors, as plainly 
as words can tell, that this is an unsafe and unprofitable form of investment.’’  
 206. MEEKER, supra note 120, at 133. 
 207. HUEBNER, supra note 134, at 34.  
 208. Barsky & De Long, Bull and Bear, supra note 192, at 275 (citing BENJAMIN GRAHAM AND 
DAVID DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS (1934)).  
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skeptical assessment, suggesting in 1949, ‘‘there is a mass of evidence 
which indicates that there is more trading on price movements, or 
movement trading, than there is value trading.’’209 
Despite such skepticism, pre-1960s investors had a plausible intel-
lectual foundation for assuming that fluctuations in share prices reflected 
actual changes to a company’s fundamentals. The fact that the price was 
being set by way of arm’s length transactions with no inherent bias con-
cerning outcomes was a pivotal consideration. Adolf Berle, the distin-
guished corporate law academic, acknowledged the point in a 1931 arti-
cle on stock market manipulation.210 He said of a situation where an 
investor purchased shares on the stock market at the ‘‘ask’’ price of a 
prospective seller, the price ‘‘becomes a material factor in all other ap-
praisals of that security, of greater or less weight depending on the situa-
tion, but of very real importance in permitting the buyers and sellers to 
estimate the value of the stock in question.’’211 It follows that even if 
share prices did not incorporate as much information prior to the mid-
twentieth century as was the case thereafter, prior to the formulation of 
the ECMH, investors nevertheless generally believed that those prices 
were a reliable barometer of what potential target companies would be 
worth. 
Drawing matters together, there appears to be little direct support 
for the idea that uninformed investors placed more faith in the veracity 
of stock market prices in the 1960s than they did previously. This, in turn, 
casts doubt on the idea that such a change might have led to a steepening 
of supply curves faced by acquirors pursuing OMBs in a way that would 
explain the switch to tender offers we document. It remains possible, 
though, as Part V.B. indicated, that supply curves for shares of target 
companies steepened because informed investors could decode OMBs 
more effectively. To the extent this was the case, it would have been an-
ticipated that share prices would have responded more dramatically over 
time to the potential acquisition of a controlling stake by way of stock 
market purchases. We will consider now the limited evidence available 
on share price reactions in such circumstances. 
E. Share Price Responses to Open Market Bids 
The early history of the ECMH and the impounding of a wider 
range of relevant information in share prices after the introduction of 
federal securities law in the 1930s lend credence to the idea that increases 
in stock market efficiency meant by the 1960s share price responses to 
                                                                                                                                         
 209. Wayne A. Leeman, An Evaluation of Organized Speculation, 16 S. ECON. J. 139, 143 (1949) 
(emphasis in original). For another example, see Lewis H. Haney, Corporation Accounting Data from 
the Standpoint of the Investor, 25 AM. STAT. ASS’N (supplementary issue) 7, 10 (1930) (saying of ‘‘. . . 
the so-called good companies whose stocks command high prices. No one knows what they are worth, 
and this makes it possible to entertain exaggerated hopes.’’).  
 210. A.A. Berle, Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 264 (1931). 
 211. Id. at 270.  
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OMBs largely precluded use of this tactic. The evidence just reviewed 
regarding investor perceptions suggests that any such effect more likely 
occurred through better price decoding by informed investors than in-
creasing reliance on stock prices by uninformed investors. What does the 
evidence on share price reactions to OMBs tell us? 
A 1958 bid by Edward Gilbert, part of a family that owned New 
York floor-maker Empire Millwork Corp., to obtain control of hard-
wood manufacturers E.L. Bruce & Co. reveals that a dramatic price in-
crease fostered by an OMB was not merely a theoretical possibility.212 
The fight for control, which, as press reports noted, was-----
uncharacteristically for that era-----driven by heavy stock market purchas-
es by Gilbert and his family rather than canvassing for proxies, drove 
E.L. Bruce’s share price up precipitously. The price of E.L. Bruce shares, 
which were trading for $17 in early 1958, rose dramatically until the 
American Stock Exchange suspended trading in June when the stock hit 
$77 amidst concerns that there was a ‘‘corner’’ in the shares because the 
total number of shares being sold ‘‘short’’ in response to the price in-
crease exceeded the available supply.213 Gilbert himself paid $61 for a 
sizeable proportion of the stock he bought, a price far in excess of the 
$17 level at which the shares had been trading. Even then he failed to ac-
quire an outright majority and had to use his sizeable minority stake as 
leverage to negotiate a deal where he would share control of the board 
with the incumbent management team.214 
While Gilbert’s bid to obtain control of E.L. Bruce & Co. clearly il-
lustrates the risks for a bidder undertaking an OMB, the fact the bid oc-
curred in 1958 leaves open the possibility that in earlier decades the price 
reaction would have been sufficiently modest to mean that OMBs would 
have been feasible. Resolving the point definitively is impossible, but it 
appears that even in the opening decades of the twentieth century, there 
was a real risk that the share purchases underpinning an OMB could re-
sult in decoding that would drive the target company’s share price up. 
According to a 1928 guide on stock market speculation, ‘‘[e]ach im-
portant situation in a corporation’s finances has a direct reaction in the 
market for that corporation’s shares. If the situation is very drastic, 
where, for example, a contest for acquisition of the shares is in progress, 
the stock price may shoot wildly upwards.’’215 Similarly, a 1934 analysis of 
the stock market indicated that, for those seeking to accumulate a large 
holding in a company, ‘‘bidding for the stock will tend to raise the price 
                                                                                                                                         
 212. On this contest for control, see Vartanig G. Vartan, Bruce Proxy Fight Ended, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 30, 1958, at 12; JOHN BROOKS, THE GO-GO YEARS 63--64 (1973).  
 213. After trading was suspended, the price went as high as $188 in over-the-counter trading. 
BROOKS, supra note 212, at 64. 
 214. In 1961, Empire Millwork, renamed Empire National, merged with E.L. Bruce & Co. Gilbert 
expropriated in 1962 $2 million from the corporate till and fled to Brazil when his bid to acquire a 
larger company foundered. BROOKS, supra note 212, at 65, 70--75. 
 215. FREDERIC DREW BOND, STOCK MOVEMENTS AND SPECULATION 71 (1928). 
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unduly.’’216 Likewise, a 1937 report by a NYSE special committee said 
that it was ‘‘now more difficult than formerly to sell or to purchase blocks 
of stocks without affecting prices in a manner adverse to the interest of 
the buyer or seller.’’217 
These accounts suggest that, whether by virtue of price decoding or 
not, with OMBs there was even in the opening decades of the twentieth 
century a good chance that the target’s share price would increase rapid-
ly. We correspondingly might have expected to encounter cash tender 
offers at this time, but as we have seen (Figure 5), this takeover tech-
nique was almost never used during the opening half of the twentieth 
century. We do not know how difficult it was over time for an acquiror to 
commence an OMB without investors using price decoding to ascertain 
what was occurring. There is reason to believe, however, that it would 
have been easier for bidders to escape detection as the twentieth century 
got underway than would have been the case by the 1960s. One clue is 
that companies disclosed considerably less firm-specific information dur-
ing the opening decades of the twentieth century than they would subse-
quently. Correspondingly, it would have been more difficult for price de-
coding investors to discern whether a significant price increase was 
attributable to trading based on undisclosed good news or to the launch-
ing of an OMB.218 It is also possible that early twentieth century acquirors 
relied on market manipulation to a greater extent to disguise information 
about their trading activity to avoid detection. There is plausible histori-
cal evidence substantiating this latter conjecture, as we shall see next. 
F. Market Manipulation 
1. Disguising an OMB 
Tactically astute buying and selling of shares provided means by 
which an early twentieth century OMB could be undertaken without 
driving the share price of the target upwards. A 1934 edition of a guide to 
the stock market described, for instance, a party accumulating ‘‘large 
lines of stock’’ while using ‘‘the most skilful methods of accomplishing 
their purpose without attracting attention’’: 
Our operator will purchase whenever weakness develops, but 
should the price manifest an undue tendency to rise prematurely he 
will sell in order to depress the price. . . . Gradually the desired line 
of securities is accumulated, whereas the unknowing, influenced by 
the apparent weakness of the market and their impatience at not 
seeing the market improve, dispose of their holdings.219 
Another more manipulative technique that parties seeking to carry 
out an OMB could use to cover their tracks would be to spread rumors 
                                                                                                                                         
 216. HUEBNER, supra note 134, at 327--28. 
 217. Quoted in ROSS, supra note 17, at 124--25.  
 218. For more detail on the logic involved, see supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
 219. HUEBNER, supra note 134, at 400. 
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that the target was going through difficult times and sell shares periodi-
cally to reinforce the bad news. As the 1928 edition of another guide to 
the stock market said of ‘‘getting control of the floating supply’’ of shares 
in a company ‘‘by buying on the market’’: 
This requires plentiful credit and time, perhaps a few weeks, per-
haps a few months. Stocks, of course, must be accumulated at a low 
price. To induce holders to sell at a bottom figure, reactions in the 
market are exaggerated by concerted selling, rumors of financial 
difficulty ahead, of small earnings, of new financing, and so forth. 
The price of the stock will be run up a few points and then left to 
sink back below its former level. No permanent advance is permit-
ted. The newspapers call attention to the false starts followed by re-
actions, and no progress made. This goes on week after week until 
holders get disgusted with their stock and sell out.220 
The ‘‘matched order’’ was an additional manipulative tactic that 
could be used to temper a share price increase that would have otherwise 
been associated with an attempt to obtain voting control by way of open 
market purchases.221 The most straightforward way for the bidder to pro-
ceed would have been to give a first broker orders to sell shares already 
owned at prices progressively lower than the current market price and 
simultaneously give, unbeknownst to the first broker, a second broker 
orders to buy shares at the prevailing stock market price.222 So long as the 
purchases by the second broker were large enough to be recorded on the 
stock exchange ticker, the matching of the orders would cause the price 
indicated by the stock market ticker to fall.223 This might well prompt 
nervous investors to sell and drive the price down still further.224 The par-
ty seeking to acquire control could then snap up a sizeable number of 
shares cheaply.225 
The relative paucity of public information available to informed in-
vestors about companies during the opening decades of the twentieth 
century likely facilitated the efforts of those seeking to acquire control of 
a company by way of an OMB without pushing the share price upwards 
inordinately. As we have seen, while during this era there was limited 
scope for investors to make decisions to buy and sell shares on the basis 
of disclosures companies made, various investors apparently engaged in 
                                                                                                                                         
 220. DICE, supra note 131, at 429--30. 
 221. Finance: ‘‘Matching Orders’’ on the Stock Exchange, THE NATION, Aug. 27, 1908, at 193; 
DICE, supra note 131, at 423 (describing matched orders).  
 222. The Stock Exchange Begins Self Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1913, at 1 (providing a detailed 
example of the pattern but focusing on a party that wanted to drive the share price up rather than 
down).  
 223. One hundred shares was the minimum because the New York Stock Exchange constitution 
specified that 100 shares constituted the unit of trading. DICE, supra note 131, at 266.  
 224. DANA L. THOMAS, THE PLUNGERS AND THE PEACOCKS: 150 YEARS OF WALL STREET 47 
(1967).  
 225. DICE, supra note 131, at 423--24 (indicating that one purpose of matched orders was to ac-
cumulate ‘‘a lot’’ of stock ‘‘at a very low price’’).  
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price decoding when deciding whether to buy and sell shares.226 The pro-
cess was described by Richard Wyckoff, the editor of The Magazine of 
Wall Street, in a 1924 guide on investing in shares: 
It long ago occurred to me that success in the security market de-
manded an understanding of the operations of those who were most 
influential, because these interests had been studying the business 
and operating in the market for many years and were therefore ex-
perts. It was sound reasoning to suppose that a knowledge of the 
principles which they used in their market operations would enable 
one to detect their thumbprints on the tape and to follow with 
pleasure and profit.227 
Wyckoff conceded, however, that market manipulation could complicate 
the decoding process in a way that would discourage substantial upward 
price pressure caused by the sort of heavy buying implied by an OMB: 
But there is another kind of suggestion which is the most potent in 
its influence on the public, and that is the action of the market itself. 
A rising price for a stock suggests still higher prices and declining 
quotations bear the inference that prices are going lower. . . . 
[G]roups will often try to depress a stock, counting on the public’s 
support when the issue begins to decline.228 
A bidder seeking to carry out an OMB without driving up the share 
price markedly might well lack the expertise to achieve the desired result 
and thus might rely on a savvy stock market operator to acquire the 
shares. A 1901 contest for control of the Northern Pacific railway be-
tween J.P. Morgan and the Union Pacific railroad run by E.H. Harriman 
illustrates how stock market operators could be called upon to execute 
an OMB. To gain the upper hand, Morgan recruited James Keene, said 
to be ‘‘the most successful stock speculator Wall street has ever seen,’’229 
to buy the Northern Pacific shares required.230 Similarly, in 1911, Thomas 
Ryan, a tobacco magnate, asked Bernard Baruch, a prominent stock-
broker, to acquire enough shares on the open market to give Ryan con-
trol of Wabash Railway, which Baruch proceeded to do.231 Ryan also 
asked Baruch to buy control of the Norfolk and Western Railway by way 
of open market purchases, and while Baruch’s efforts to obtain outright 
control did not succeed, he purchased on Ryan’s behalf a large block of 
                                                                                                                                         
 226. See supra note 144 and accompanying text; see also David Hochfelder, ‘‘Where the Common 
People Could Speculate’’: The Ticker, Bucket Shops, and the Origins of Popular Participation in Finan-
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 227. RICHARD D. WYCKOFF, HOW I TRADE AND INVEST IN STOCKS & BONDS 99--100 (1924). 
 228. Id. at 99.  
 229. A Giant of Wall Street, BALT. SUN, Mar. 29, 1903, at 2. See also BERNARD M. BARUCH, 
BARUCH: MY OWN STORY 155 (1957) (describing Keene as a ‘‘wizard’’); Victor Smith, Meteoric Career 
of John W. Gates, Skilful Juggler of Millions, ATLANTA CONST., June 15, 1902, at A4 (saying Keene 
was ‘‘regarded as the ablest operator the street has known’’); James R. Keene, N.Y. TIMES, January 30, 
1910, at SM2 (‘‘master manipulator’’). 
 230. MAURY KLEIN, THE LIFE & LEGEND OF E.H. HARRIMAN 233 (2000).  
 231. BARUCH, supra note 229, at 112; JAMES GRANT, BERNARD M. BARUCH, THE ADVENTURES 
OF A WALL STREET LEGEND 107 (1997).  
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Norfolk and Western shares, doing so without advancing the share price 
materially.232 Baruch attributed his success with the Wabash Railway 
partly to his ability to persuade a broker specializing in Wabash stock to 
refrain from using Baruch’s sizeable buying orders as a signal to buy Wa-
bash shares, citing the broker’s awareness that Baruch would reciprocate 
at some point in the future.233 
2. How Prevalent was Market Manipulation? 
Ascertaining in any sort of definitive way the impact of market ma-
nipulation on the market for corporate control would require knowing 
how prevalent the practice was. For the opening decades of the twentieth 
century, the limited evidence on point is mixed. For instance, while in 
1904 Thomas Lawson forcefully accused James Keene of using fictitious 
transactions to make bogus prices,234 Lawson was a trenchant critic of the 
Wall Street ‘‘System’’ who alleged ‘‘malefactions uncountable, lootings 
incomputable’’235 and engaged in ‘‘imaginative disclosures,’’236 perhaps ‘‘to 
launch various enterprises in unlisted stocks.’’237 Also, while a 1917 guide 
to Wall Street claimed ‘‘[m]anipulation . . . is always going on, within lim-
its, in any active market’’238 and a 1994 study of accounting history said 
‘‘[s]tocks of numerous industrial companies were manipulated . . . during 
the early part of the century,’’239 a 1913 magazine study of the New York 
Stock Exchange said ‘‘[w]hether this manipulation still continues and to 
what extent is a debated question.’’240 Similarly Van Antwerp’s 1914 
guide to the stock exchange suggested ‘‘[t]he Keene type of manipulator 
has gone, never to return.’’241 
While the prevalence of market manipulation as the twentieth cen-
tury opened is uncertain, there can be little doubt that as time pro-
gressed, it would have become more difficult for even a highly skilled 
stock market operator to mute share price increases otherwise associated 
with an open market bid. The reaction of investors to stock price changes 
                                                                                                                                         
 232. BARUCH, supra note 229, at 112.  
 233. Id. at 118--19.  
 234. Lawson Assails James R. Keene, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 23, 1904, at 2.  
 235. Henry Alloway, Twenty-Five Years After Lawson, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1929, at 7.  
 236. In the Days of Frenzied Finance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1925, at 22. 
 237. MARTIN, supra note 56, at 12.  
 238. SELDEN, supra note 137, at 169.  
 239. Previts & Bricker, supra note 112, at 631.  
 240. Harold J. Howland, Gambling Joint or Market Place? An Inquiry Into the Workings of the 
New York Stock Exchange, OUTLOOK, June 28, 1913, at 418, 422. See also Guolin Jiang et al., Market 
Manipulation: A Comprehensive Study of Stock Pools, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 147, 169 (2005) (indicating 
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the 1920s, ‘‘the size, liquidity, and information disclosure practices of exchange-listed companies in the 
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 241. VAN ANTWERP, supra note 134, at 30. See also Keene and His Market Losses, BOST. GLOBE, 
Jan. 7, 1913, at 13 (‘‘[W]ith the passing of Mr. Keene, the last of the great single or individual manipu-
lators or operators in the securities markets has closed all of his worldly accounts.’’); Exit the Swash-
buckling Trader of Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1917, at SM8 (calling Keene ‘‘the last of the class 
of great operators’’).  
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was one factor militating against market manipulation. According to a 
1930 guide to Wall Street, ‘‘[m]anipulation depends upon a public follow-
ing for its success.’’242 Since it seems likely that over time the pricing of 
shares was increasingly driven by trading based on ‘‘hard’’ information of 
companies disclosed,243 the ability of a party to impose downward pres-
sure on share prices through skillful buying and selling of shares should 
have diminished. 
Another deterrent to market manipulation was that using matched 
orders and similar tactics to influence share prices became increasingly 
difficult as the twentieth century progressed. Increased share trading 
volume was one obstacle. As early as 1901, during a ‘‘bull market’’ when 
share trading volume was uncharacteristically high, reputedly ‘‘the pur-
chase of thousands of shares (was) necessary to advance prices,’’ making 
‘‘fictitious trading . . . practically impossible.’’244 Share trading volumes 
increased dramatically during throughout the opening decades of the 
twentieth century.245 The practical difficulties associated with share price 
manipulation correspondingly would have become more substantial over 
time. 
Expansion of share registers of potential target companies was a re-
lated problem. During the opening decade of the twentieth century, only 
a small handful of companies had share registers with more than 5,000 
stock holders.246 By the 1930s, numerous large public companies had over 
100,000 shareholders.247 The changing circumstances meant that it would 
have become increasingly difficult even for those as skilled as Keene and 
Baruch to go into the market single-handedly to purchase the shares re-
quired for an OMB and engage in the trading activity necessary to keep 
the share price in check.248 The Boston Globe confirmed the point in 
1930, citing a dramatic growth in the number of listed companies and 
their market value over the past quarter-century to explain why ‘‘indi-
vidual traders in the stock market can no longer swing the market.’’249 
Stock market historian Robert Sobel said similarly of the 1950s: 
In the past the manipulators and wheeler-dealers had been able to 
do their work in markets frequented by a relatively small number of 
investors and speculators. They were out of place in the huge arena 
of the late 1950s. Whatever else it was would become, the markets 
of the period were not manipulated by small bands of men.250 
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Increasingly stringent regulation also would have hindered market 
manipulation that could make OMBs feasible. In 1913, the New York 
Stock Exchange supplemented an existing ban on fictitious transactions 
by adopting a resolution to prevent manipulation of share prices, espe-
cially in the form of matched orders.251 Stock Exchange officials appar-
ently seldom detected or penalized such behavior.252 Nevertheless, ac-
cording to Van Antwerp’s 1914 guide on the stock exchange, fictitious 
sales were ‘‘less frequent than people suppose.’’253 Barron’s indicated sim-
ilarly in 1928 ‘‘[w]hat the rules call ‘a fictitious transaction’ is as nearly an 
impossibility as may be,’’ citing the fact that those with a $400,000 seat on 
the Exchange would not risk it ‘‘for the few dollars a petty act of dishon-
esty would yield.’’254 
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 tightened regulation of 
share price manipulation by specifically banning matched orders entered 
into for the purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance con-
cerning the market for shares of a public company.255 Wall Street veter-
ans, acknowledging that the reforms would mean there would be fewer 
instances of manipulative sharp practice, used the example of those who 
used stock market transactions to build railroad empires at the beginning 
of the twentieth century to explain the implications of the new rules, say-
ing these railroad magnates would have been unable to proceed ‘‘if their 
buying and selling of great blocks of shares had not been given the screen 
of secrecy which only an unregulated market affords.’’256 The S.E.C. sub-
sequently enforced the law on market manipulation sufficiently robustly 
to generate a sizeable body of case law.257 These enforcement efforts, 
combined with other factors that would have made market manipulation 
more difficult to execute, likely complicated efforts by acquirors to carry 
out OMBs without driving up the share price of the target substantially. 
This trend, likely more than changes to the efficiency of share prices, 
would have tipped the balance in favor of the tender offer, and thus 
stands out as a leading explanation for our finding that the tender offer 
replaced the OMB as the transfer by sale method of choice in the 1950s 
and the 1960s. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Given the significance of the market for corporate control, it is 
striking how little is known about the history of corporate control trans-
actions in the United States. In this Article, we address a significant facet 
of this history, namely linkages between share prices and the market for 
corporate control. In so doing, we make four key contributions. First, we 
present hand-collected time series data on the incidence of different 
types of hostile control transaction encompassing not only the first half 
of the twentieth century, but also the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, 
an era often identified as the one where the market for corporate control 
took on its modern form. Second, we offer predictions on how changes to 
the pricing of shares might have impacted the development of the market 
for corporate control. Third, we identify historical trends concerning 
share price efficiency, an important topic neglected in much the same 
way as the history of the market for corporate control. Fourth, we relate 
our analysis of the development of the pricing of shares to our empirical 
data on control contests to test our predictions concerning the interrela-
tionship between share prices and takeovers. 
In some circumstances, our predictions concerning the interrelation-
ship between share prices and the market for corporate control do not 
tally with our empirical findings. This is the case, for instance, with the 
popularity of exchange tender offers as compared with cash tender of-
fers. Given increases in the scope and quality of information public com-
panies had to disclose that would have been incorporated in stock prices, 
it might have been thought that shares would have become increasingly 
popular over time as a form of acquisition currency in the takeover con-
text. Our data do not reveal, however, a time trend in favor of exchange 
tender offers as compared to cash tender offers. 
On the other hand, in other ways, our theoretical analysis does ex-
plain our data well. For instance, as expected, the number of control con-
tests increased over time, as did the involvement of ‘‘outsiders’’ lacking a 
prior connection to targets. Acquirors logically will be reluctant to pro-
ceed with hostile takeovers when disclosure is rudimentary because they 
will have little faith in the share price of a prospective target as a barom-
eter of firm value and will have limited ability to carry out an independ-
ent investigation of a target’s financial circumstances. From 1900 through 
to the 1960s, public companies engaged over time in more extensive pub-
lic disclosure, and the information divulged likely was being impounded 
in share prices. These trends should have encouraged at least some oth-
erwise reluctant bidders to proceed, and this is what our data indicates 
happened. The effect logically should have been particularly pronounced 
with acquirors lacking a preexisting connection to targets because for this 
type of acquirer, a hostile takeover is very much a leap in the dark in a 
market environment where little firm specific information is disclosed. 
The fact that hostile takeovers undertaken by bidders from a different 
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industry to the target were considerably more prevalent in the 1950s and 
1960s than was the case beforehand confirms our logic. 
The fact that open market bids-----the preferred type of hostile trans-
action at the beginning of the twentieth century-----were eclipsed by ten-
der offers after World War II can also be accounted for by reference to 
trends concerning share prices. Extending back at least to the beginning 
of the twentieth century, investors have tended to assume that share 
prices provided a reasonably accurate estimate of firm value. With dis-
closure, however, by firms having been meagre at the beginning of the 
twentieth century but becoming more extensive over time, and with 
much publicized theoretical work done on the efficiency of share prices 
commencing at the end of the 1950s, investors’ faith in the accuracy of 
share prices conceivably grew over time. In a couple of ways, this could 
have made open market bids more expensive and thereby fostered the 
shift in favor of the tender offer. 
First, with the quality of corporate disclosure improving ‘‘informed’’ 
investors who focused closely on the data that companies divulged when 
deciding whether to buy and sell shares should have become better able 
over time to infer that a sudden and otherwise unexplained increase in a 
firm’s stock price was due to a bidder seeking to obtain voting control by 
way of an open market bid. Second, ‘‘uninformed’’ investors who did not 
focus closely on company fundamentals, but who had greater faith in 
share prices than their antecedents from prior eras, would have been 
more inclined to interpret a rise in price covertly prompted by an OMB 
to be good news concerning the company’s prospects. Each of these 
trends would have tended to make open market bids more expensive 
than otherwise would have been the case and could have tipped the bal-
ance in favor of tender offers. A tender offer would have made clear to 
uninformed investors that the control premium incorporated in the offer 
was due to value that would only be added if control shifted and would 
have put pressure on informed investors concerned about losing out on 
the tender offer control premium to sell out. 
Our analysis of how shares actually were priced from 1900 to the 
mid-1960s lends mixed support to these conjectures. It does seem likely 
that, by the 1950s and 1960s, decoding OMBs would have been easier for 
informed investors due to a surge in the amount of firm specific infor-
mation being disclosed and impounded in share prices. On the other 
hand, investors appeared to have considerable faith in share prices even 
prior to the much publicized research in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
that culminated in share prices being characterized as ‘‘efficient’’ under 
the efficient capital market hypothesis. Also, the limited historical evi-
dence available suggests that share prices were not markedly more ‘‘effi-
cient’’ in the 1950s and 1960s than they were in prior decades, with pub-
licly available information being quickly impounded in share prices as 
the twentieth century opened and with the stock market being equally 
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prone to ‘‘overvolatility’’ throughout the period on which we have fo-
cused. 
The displacement of open market bids by tender offers can also be 
explained by reference to changes that made market manipulation more 
difficult. A putative acquiror intent on carrying out a transfer by sale can 
at least theoretically restrict the sharp share price increase that an open 
market bid might be expected to generate by using savvy trading tech-
niques and market manipulation to put downward pressure on the price. 
Bidders may well have had substantial scope to engage in such tactics as 
the twentieth century opened. Over time, however, regulatory initiatives, 
a growing number of shareholders, and increased trading volume would 
have made it more difficult for acquirors to constrain the share price in-
creases OMBs would tend to cause. This may well have helped to open 
the way for cash tender offers to supplant open market bids when a lull 
in merger activity in the 1930s and 1940s ended, thereby making transfers 
by sale feasible. 
While our analysis indicates that developments concerning share 
prices were important to the operation of the market for corporate con-
trol, the account of takeover history offered here admittedly is partial. 
For instance, one of our most important empirical findings was the ubiq-
uity of the proxy battle as a means of capturing control across the entire 
period we investigate. Our analysis of share prices does not readily ex-
plain the pattern, even though it does shed light on other important fea-
tures of the market for corporate control. There clearly are numerous 
additional issues concerning the historical development of the market for 
corporate control that merit investigation in future research. 
 
